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  INTRODUCTION   
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs), such as the Insti-
tute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), of-
ten encourages or requires members to disclose any patents 
that might read on a standard under consideration, to “declare” 
any patents that may be essential to that standard, and to 
commit to license those patents on “reasonable and nondis-
criminatory” (RAND) or “fair, reasonable, and nondiscrimina-
tory” (FRAND) terms.1 SSOs themselves, however, typically do 
not define what a FRAND royalty for any given standard-
essential patent (SEP) would be,2 and when negotiations break 
down litigants increasingly are calling upon courts to set the 
amount of the royalty.3 The courts in turn have articulated 
various principles for setting FRAND royalties, among them: 
 
 1. See, e.g., IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.2 (INST. OF ELEC. & 
ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/ 
sb_bylaws.pdf; ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE ANNEX 6, 6.2 (EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST. 2008), http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/ 
Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf; see also RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A 
STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF 
STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 48–99 (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_ 
072197.pdf (reporting the disclosure and licensing obligations among twelve 
leading SSOs as of 2012). In the literature and case law, the acronyms 
“RAND” and “FRAND” are used interchangeably. In this Article, we use the 
term “FRAND” (which appears to be gaining in popularity) unless we are quot-
ing from a source that uses the alternative term “RAND.” 
 2. A few SSOs require members to license SEPs on a royalty-free basis, 
but this does not appear to be the majority practice. See Jorge L. Contreras, 
Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Em-
pirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 173–75 (2013) (stating that some SSOs en-
courage or require members to disclose the maximum royalty rates they would 
seek). SSOs generally have avoided setting FRAND royalties for a variety of 
reasons. But see Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 
HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1027–29, 1046 n.65 (2010) (suggesting that “firms might 
prefer the ambiguous RAND commitment over a more conventional, explicit 
pricing term” due to “the desirable absence of lawyers,” time constraints, lack 
of information about the value of the technology at the point in time at which 
a standard is adopted, and out of concerns over antitrust liability). 
 3. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 
2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (determining the amount of a 
FRAND royalty in an infringement action); see also Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (reviewing the district court’s 
“lengthy, thorough bench trial on the RAND rate and range”); Ericsson, Inc. v. 
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(1) The royalty should prevent SEP owners from exercising patent 
“hold-up.”4 
(2) Courts should minimize the risk of “royalty stacking,” in which a 
seller incurs an excessive royalty burden as a result of marketing a 
product incorporating multiple, separately owned patents.5 
(3) A FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental ex ante value of 
the technology in comparison with alternatives.6 
 
D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing a jury’s determina-
tion of a FRAND royalty in a patent infringement action); Apple Inc. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the expert’s testimony 
regarding royalty rates was admissible and improperly excluded by the dis-
trict court in an infringement action). Courts in Japan and China also have 
determined FRAND royalties. For further discussion, see Norman V. 
Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined FRAND Royalties, in 1 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., forthcoming 2017). 
 4. See Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1031, 1052 (“[T]he very purpose of the 
RAND agreement is to promote adoption of a standard by decreasing the risk 
of hold-up.”), aff ’g No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 25, 2013) (“[A] proper methodology used to determine a RAND royalty 
should therefore recognize and seek to mitigate the risk of patent hold-up that 
RAND commitments are intended to avoid.”); Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*8 (“[O]ne of the primary purposes of the RAND commitment is to avoid pa-
tent hold-up, which occurs when the holder of a standard-essential patent de-
mands excess royalties after standard implementers are already locked into 
using the standard.”); cf. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1234 (“The district court need 
not instruct the jury on hold-up or stacking unless the accused infringer pre-
sents actual evidence of hold-up or stacking.”). 
 5. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *86 (stating that “RAND is in-
formed by two prevailing concerns: preventing stacking and eliminating hold-
up,” and that “among these two goals, the anti-stacking principle is the prima-
ry constraint on the upper bound of RAND”); see also Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 
1031; Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9–10; cf. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1209 
(acknowledging the potential for royalty stacking “when a standard implicates 
numerous patents”); id. at 1234 (affirming the district court’s refusal to give a 
jury instruction on royalty stacking, for lack of evidence that stacking was a 
real, as opposed to a theoretical, issue that negotiating parties would have ad-
dressed). Royalty stacking can be viewed as a manifestation of the “Cournot 
complements” problem, which arises “when separate owners of complementary 
inputs each demand what is (for them) the individually profit-maximizing 
price, in exchange for permission to include those inputs in an end product,” 
with the result that “the cost of producing the end product” will be “higher 
than the social optimum.” Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, 
and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1169 (2009); see also FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2, at 23 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013 
(2007) (“The Theory of Cournot complements teaches us that the royalty stack-
ing problem is likely to be worse the greater the number of independent own-
ers of patents that read on a product.”). 
 6. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *19 (stating that the court should 
“consider the utility and advantages of the patented property over alternatives 
  
1162 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1159 
 
(4) The royalty should be proportionate to the technology’s im-
portance to the standard and to users of the standard (the “propor-
tionality” principle).7 
(5) The royalty should not reflect “any value added by the standardi-
zation of that technology,” that is, “by the standard’s adoption of the 
patented technology”8—or, as another court put it, simply, “the value 
of the standard.”9 
 
that could have been written into the standard instead of the patented tech-
nology in the period before the standard was adopted,” because “the presence 
of equally effective alternatives to the patented technology that could have 
been adopted into the standard will drive down the royalty that the patent 
holder could reasonably demand”); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13 (stat-
ing that “ex ante examination of the incremental contribution of the patented 
technology to the standard can be helpful in determining a RAND rate in the 
context of a dispute over a RAND royalty rate,” and that “comparison of the 
patented technology to the alternatives that the SSO could have written into 
the standard is a consideration in determining a RAND royalty”). 
 7. The court in Microsoft refers both to the importance of the patent to 
the standard and its importance to users’ products. Microsoft, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *3, *20 (characterizing as “central to the court’s analysis” the 
principle “that the parties in a hypothetical negotiation would set RAND roy-
alty rates by looking at the importance of the SEPs to the standard and the 
importance of the standard and the SEPs to the products at issue,” and stating 
that “a patent that is extremely important and central to the standard would 
reasonably command a higher royalty rate than a less important patent”). The 
court in Innovatio merges the two. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (“[Be-
cause] the appropriate royalty base in this case is the Wi-Fi chip, [the purpose 
of which is] to provide 802.11 functionality, determining the importance of 
Innovatio’s patents to the 802.11 standard also determines the importance of 
those patents to the Wi-Fi chip. Accordingly, the court’s analysis does not in-
clude a separate section evaluating the importance of Innovatio’s patents to 
the accused products, but instead merges that analysis into the inquiry about 
the importance of Innovatio’s patents to the 802.11 standard.”); see also Erics-
son, 773 F.3d at 1232–33 (“Just as we apportion damages for a patent that co-
vers a small part of a device, we must also apportion damages for SEPs that 
cover only a small part of a standard.”). 
 8. See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232 (“When dealing with SEPs, there are 
two special apportionment issues that arise. First, the patented feature must 
be apportioned from all of the unpatented features reflected in the standard. 
Second, the patentee’s royalty must be premised on the value of the patented 
feature, not any value added by the standard’s adoption of the patented tech-
nology. These steps are necessary to ensure that the royalty award is based on 
the incremental value that the patented invention adds to the product, not any 
value added by the standardization of that technology.”); see also Common-
wealth Sci. & Indus. Res. Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Ericsson). 
 9. Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1053 (“The fact that Motorola’s patents were of 
minor import to the H.264 standard . . . was evidence from which the jury 
could infer that demanding a 2.25% royalty rate was not a good-faith effort to 
realize the value of the technology, but rather an attempt to capitalize on the 
value of the standard itself—that is, to obtain the hold-up value.”); Microsoft, 
2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (“The ability of a holder of an SEP to demand more 
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(6) The royalty should be adequate to preserve the patent incentive 
(the “incentive to invent” principle).10 
(7) The royalty should provide an adequate incentive to participate in 
the standard setting process (the “incentive to participate” princi-
ple).11 
Unfortunately, the courts have not been entirely clear 
about how one might go about trying to satisfy all of these prin-
ciples (or whether doing so is even possible). Outside the 
FRAND context, courts often consider the fifteen amorphous 
Georgia-Pacific factors12 to determine the amount of a reason-
 
than the value of its patented technology and to attempt to capture the value 
of the standard itself is referred to as patent ‘hold-up.’”); see also Innovatio, 
2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (quoting Microsoft); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 
F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“The purpose of the FRAND require-
ments . . . is to confine the patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by 
the patent itself as distinct from the additional value—the hold-up value—
conferred by the patent’s being designated as standard-essential.”), rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 10. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *11 (“[A] RAND rate must be set 
high enough to ensure that innovators in the future have an appropriate in-
centive to invest in future developments and to contribute their inventions to 
the standard-setting process.”); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *80 (“[S]ince 
licensing through SSOs under the RAND commitment is, at least for some en-
tities, an important component of profitability, reducing that component would 
reduce the incentive to innovate and thereby slow the pace of innovation in the 
economy.”). The idea that damages should be adequate to preserve the patent 
incentive scheme is uncontroversial. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. 
Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[L]ost profits compensation . . . pre-
serves constitutional incentives.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 
52 (2011) (“The ability of patentees to allege patent infringement and enter ex 
post transactions is a necessary feature supporting the patent system’s incen-
tives to innovate. . . . Either royalty payments or an exclusive market position 
can allow a patentee to capture returns from its investment in making and de-
veloping an invention, which creates incentives for innovation.”). Though 
whether that incentive is necessary to induce invention, disclosure, innova-
tion, and other social benefits, and whether courts could in some instances ad-
just patent remedies to better ensure that the reward is commensurate with 
these benefits, are interesting, but separate issues. For discussion, see, for ex-
ample, Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 517, 554–69 (2014) (arguing that, ideally, courts would award 
damages sufficient to maintain the patent incentive, which could be higher or 
lower than the patentee’s but-for damages). 
 11. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *11; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, 
at *12 (“To induce the creation of valuable standards, the RAND commitment 
must guarantee that holders of valuable intellectual property will receive rea-
sonable royalties on that property.”); see also Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pay-
ments and Participation: The Incentives To Join Cooperative Standard Setting 
Efforts, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 24 (2014) (discussing the impact of a 
licensing cap on standard setting). 
 12. See Georgia-Pac. Co. v. U.S. Plywood Co., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
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able royalty, a practice critics sometimes deride as enabling the 
trier of fact to award damages in almost any amount.13 Does a 
similar risk arise that, by invoking the seven principles listed 
above, a court could characterize almost any damages award as 
consistent with FRAND terms? Are the principles themselves 
mutually consistent, or should some of them be modified or dis-
carded? Might there be some deeper, foundational principle 
that could unite some or all of the above into a coherent whole? 
This Article proposes, as a foundational principle, that a 
FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental contribution of 
the patent to the value of the standard to the user.14 This princi-
ple combines three related ideas we develop and defend in the 
body of the Article. The first is that royalties should reflect the 
hypothetical bargain that reasonable parties would have struck 
ex ante (prior to incurring sunk costs) in light of the incre-
mental value of the technology over unpatented alternatives as 
revealed ex post (an approach we refer to in a companion paper 
as “contingent ex ante”).15 Second, multiple patents reading on 
a standard should be valued in proportion to their marginal 
contribution to the standard (what we refer to below as “ex post 
Shapley pricing”). Third, the value of the standard to the user 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen potentially relevant factors for calculating rea-
sonable royalties), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971); see 
also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–36 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (applying the Georgia-Pacific factors). 
 13. See, e.g., Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific 
Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 5 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1704 
(2010) (providing an overview of the various sources of criticism). In the 
FRAND context, the courts in Innovatio and Microsoft both applied modified 
versions of the Georgia-Pacific factors. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*5–8; Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *17–20. 
 14. Some other commentators have proposed that a FRAND royalty 
should reflect the marginal or incremental contribution of the patent to the 
standard. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in 
Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 693 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, 
Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 980–81 (2013). However, 
as will become apparent in the text above, the meaning they accord this prin-
ciple is materially different from ours. 
 15. Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for De-
termining Reasonable Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2528616. To be more precise, under the 
contingent ex ante approach the patentee is entitled to the value of the pa-
tented technology ex ante (that is, prior to incurring sunk costs) given that the 
patent is chosen for inclusion in the standard, over the value of the next-best 
unpatented technology ex ante had that technology been chosen for inclusion 
in the standard. See infra note 42, Part III.A, Appendix B. 
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determines the user’s maximum willingness to pay. The user is 
not interested in licensing patent rights as such; what the user 
wants is the right to use the standard.16 The amount the user is 
willing to pay for that right therefore depends on the value of 
the standard to the user, not on matters such as how many 
patents read on the technology, whether those patents are held 
by one patentee or by many, whether the standard was for-
mally developed by an SSO or arose de facto, or whether the 
value results from widespread adoption due to network effects, 
efficient design, or the whims of fashion. None of these factors 
affect the value of the standard to the user, and consequently, 
none should affect the reasonable royalty the user is required 
to pay. As we will show, our approach is more firmly grounded 
in innovation policy than any of the competing approaches ad-
vanced to date. Moreover, our proposal provides a foundation 
for interpreting the seven principles articulated above that will 
enable courts to apply those principles in a coherent and con-
sistent manner. 
The key to understanding our approach rests on unpacking 
Principle (5)’s reference to the “value of the standard.” As we 
will show, courts and others have used this or similar terms in 
reference to three distinct phenomena, which we refer to as 
“sunk costs holdup,” “network value appropriation,” and the 
“apportionment problem.” Sunk costs holdup may arise when-
ever the adoption of a standard requires users to incur invest-
ment-specific sunk costs. Here the concern is that a patentee 
armed with an injunction might be able to extract some portion 
of those sunk costs, above and beyond the value of its inven-
tion.17 So understood, sunk costs holdup is not limited to the 
standards context—or even the patent context—though in prac-
tice standards often do require implementers to make transac-
tion-specific investments. Consequently, in some sense sunk 
costs holdup can be (and sometimes is)18 described as capturing 
 
 16. See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties To Value Patented 
Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 116–18 (2014) (arguing that the fundamental 
goal of patent remedies should be to accurately value the patented technology, 
because doing so serves the public policy purpose of providing optimal incen-
tives to invent). 
 17. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 612–13 (2007); see also infra Part I. 
 18. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031, 1053 (9th 
Cir. 2015); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 5; NAT’L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 62–63 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 
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the value of standardization, although strictly what is captured 
by the patentee is some part of the user’s sunk costs that are 
incurred on standardization. 
The second phenomenon, network value appropriation, 
arises whenever the value of a particular technology increases 
upon standardization due to the presence of network effects.19 
As with sunk costs holdup, an injunction would enable the pat-
entee to extract a higher royalty ex post than it could have ne-
gotiated ex ante, and thus this too might be described as result-
ing in the capture of some of the value of the standard—though 
in this context, the increase in value is due to network effects 
and does not depend on the presence of transaction-specific 
sunk costs. 
While both of the preceding phenomena could arise even 
when a standard incorporates just a single patent, the appor-
tionment problem arises when a standard embodies multiple 
patents, each of which contributes only some portion of the 
overall value of the standard. Because each patent is essential20 
to the implementation of the standard, one patentee armed 
with an injunction can capture the full value of the standard 
from a user, even though it adds only a small part of the value 
of the standard. The apportionment problem does not depend 
on transaction-specific investments by the user; rather it turns, 
 
2013); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, COMMENTARY ON PATENT DAMAGES AND 
REMEDIES, PUBLIC COMMENT VERSION 26–27 (2014). 
 19. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 20. Many patents declared to be essential are not in fact essential. See, 
e.g., FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, INC., REVIEW OF PATENTS DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL 
TO LTE AND SAE (4G WIRELESS STANDARDS) THROUGH JUNE 30, 2009, at 2 
(2010), http://www.frlicense.com/LTE%20Final%20Report.pdf (reporting that 
only fifty percent of 210 declared-essential patents studied were essential as 
judged by the authors’ panel of experts). We exclude such patents on the view 
that, in principle, a user can resist any excessive royalty demands that turn on 
essentiality by showing that the patent is not essential. (Note that the user 
nonetheless might be subjected to excessive demands based on sunk costs 
holdup, as this does not depend on the patent being essential.) Further, a pa-
tent may also be essential to either a mandatory or optional part of the stand-
ard; IEEE-SA Bylaw 6.1, for example, defines both to be “essential.” IEEE-SA 
STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf. We will use 
the term essential to mean a patent that is essential to the standard as im-
plemented by the user. That includes all patents that are essential to manda-
tory aspects of the standard, and all patents that are essential to an optional 
part if that option is implemented by the particular user. A user will not be 
liable to pay any excessive royalty—or indeed any royalty—for a patent that is 
essential to an optional part of the standard that the user does not implement, 
because it will not infringe. 
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albeit indirectly, on network effects, because the patentee’s 
ability to demand more than the value of its own contribution 
derives from the fact that the user would have to abandon the 
standard if it does not license the patent.21 The three phenom-
ena can be compared and contrasted using the following table22: 
Table 1: Three Distinct Phenomena 
              Feature 
 
 
Phenomenon    
Transaction-
specific 
investment 
by users 
Network 
effects 
More than 
one patent 
Sunk costs 
holdup REQUIRED 
NOT 
REQUIRED 
NOT 
REQUIRED 
Network value 
appropriation 
NOT 
REQUIRED REQUIRED 
NOT 
REQUIRED 
Apportionment NOT REQUIRED REQUIRED REQUIRED 
 
We argue that these three phenomena have distinct policy 
implications. While all can be described as involving holdup, in 
the loose sense that a patentee armed with an injunction can 
obtain a higher royalty after standardization than before, the 
economic implications—and, consequently, the appropriate re-
sponse—are very different. Sunk costs holdup has adverse ef-
fects on both user behavior, by making investment riskier, and 
on inventor behavior, by creating an excessive incentive to pat-
ent.23 Sunk costs holdup is appropriately addressed by use of an 
 
 21. One might imagine that the user could avoid the apportionment prob-
lem simply by redesigning its product to avoid using a patented technology 
that contributes little or no value to that particular user, especially if the abil-
ity to advertise that its product is standard-compliant is not commercially val-
uable. However, the licensing terms for the other patents that are essential to 
the standard will typically contain a term specifying that the license extends 
only to products that comply with the standard, which means that the user 
cannot abandon a minor technology without abandoning the important tech-
nologies at the same time. See STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY 
MANUAL 60–61 (AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION SECTION 
OF SCI. & TECH. LAW) (discussing clause k). 
 22. “Required” in the table means that a feature (e.g., network effects) 
must be present for the phenomenon (e.g., network value appropriation) to ex-
ist, whereas “Not Required” means that the phenomenon (e.g., sunk costs 
holdup) is not dependent on the feature (e.g., network effects). “Not Required” 
does not imply that the feature is irrelevant. Network effects may exacerbate 
sunk costs holdup, for example, even though sunk costs holdup is not depend-
ent on the presence of network effects. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
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ex ante hypothetical negotiation framework, in which the par-
ties are assumed to bargain before any sunk costs are in-
curred.24 By contrast, network value appropriation does not 
have any adverse effects on either user or patentee behavior, 
other than those that are inherent in the patent system gener-
ally. Consequently, network value appropriation is not a con-
cern that should be addressed in assessing FRAND royalties, 
and it is a mistake to conflate this phenomenon with sunk costs 
holdup. Indeed, we argue that the incentive-to-invent and in-
centive-to-participate principles require that the SEP owner 
should be able to capture some portion of the network effects (if 
any) arising from standardization, though not the sunk costs. 
Thus, we recommend that, in contrast to the “pure” or incre-
mental ex ante approach as embodied in Principle (3), courts 
should construct the bargain the patentee and the implementer 
would have negotiated ex ante (thus avoiding sunk costs 
holdup), but with awareness of all relevant information that is 
revealed ex post, including the fact that the patent was incor-
porated into the standard. 
Finally, the apportionment problem has adverse effects on 
patentee behavior by potentially overcompensating minor in-
ventions and on user behavior to the extent it contributes to 
royalty stacking.25 Moreover, because the apportionment prob-
lem relates to the division of royalties among patentees, it is 
not properly addressed by the timing of the negotiation be-
tween the patentee and the user. Instead, we argue, it should 
be addressed by ex post Shapley pricing, which applies the 
well-established economic concept of Shapley pricing26 to the 
patents actually selected to be part of the standard, in order to 
assess the relative value of various contributions to a standard 
in a manner that is both intuitively appealing and sound in 
terms of economic incentives. In particular, ex post Shapley 
pricing provides a way to estimate the value of individual SEPs 
that satisfies both the proportionality principle and the “avoid 
royalty stacking” principle, while also enabling a reasoned in-
terpretation of what it should mean for courts to avoid basing 
FRAND royalties on “the value of the standard.”27 
 
 24. See infra note 43. 
 25. See infra Part III.B. 
 26. See infra Part II.E. 
 27. See infra Part III.C. 
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Put another way, when coupled with the contingent ex 
ante approach, ex post Shapley pricing results in a royalty that 
reflects the incremental contribution of the patent to the value of 
the standard to the user. This has both positive and negative 
implications for the existing theories of how to calculate 
FRAND royalties.28 On the one hand, under our proposal a pat-
entee cannot capture more than the patent’s incremental con-
tribution to the value of the standard, as the “ex ante” aspect 
ensures that the patentee cannot capture any part of the user’s 
sunk costs. To that extent, our approach reflects the estab-
lished consensus. On the other hand, we reject the common 
view that the patentee should be confined to the value of its 
technology prior to standardization and argue instead that the 
patentee should be able to capture some portion of the inven-
tion’s increase in value attributable to network effects, as re-
vealed ex post. Importantly, Shapley pricing ensures that any 
individual patentee is confined to its incremental contribution 
to that value. The application of Shapley pricing ex post (to the 
patents actually selected for inclusion in the standard) is con-
sistent with the principle of conditioning the hypothetical nego-
tiation on knowledge of which patents actually were selected to 
be part of the standard, and also is intended to maintain the 
appropriate incentive to invent. 
To be sure, our proposed approach, like most idealized 
models, probably cannot be directly implemented in practice. It 
is nonetheless useful as a conceptual benchmark for assessing 
the merits of more practical methodologies and comparators, 
which should serve as proxies for the theoretical ideal.29 Our 
approach also provides a principled way of interpreting the 
valuation principles articulated in the emerging case law, as 
well as the recently adopted IEEE-SA Bylaws (which, like some 
of the cases cited above, states that a FRAND royalty should 
not include the value resulting from a patent’s inclusion in a 
standard).30 Properly understood, these statements should pre-
clude courts from awarding royalties based on sunk costs 
 
 28. See infra Part III.D. 
 29. See infra Part III.D. 
 30. See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & 
ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/ 
sb_bylaws.pdf. (defining a “Reasonable Rate” as meaning “appropriate com-
pensation to the patent holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim 
excluding the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential Pa-
tent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard”). 
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holdup, and from allowing SEPs that add little value to a stan-
dard to capture a substantial portion of the standard’s ex post 
value—though not from allowing the recovery of some portion 
of the value added by standardization. 
Part I below distinguishes the concepts of sunk costs 
holdup and network value appropriation, while Part II cri-
tiques the “auction model” that is the best known formal model 
of the incremental ex ante approach. Part III then lays out our 
proposed framework, under which the royalty reflects the in-
cremental contribution of the patent to the value of the stan-
dard to the user and its implications for real-world practice. 
I.  SUNK COSTS HOLDUP AND NETWORK VALUE 
APPROPRIATION   
We begin our analysis by distinguishing between “sunk 
costs holdup,” which depends on technology-specific invest-
ments made by the user,31 and “network value appropriation,” 
which depends on network effects.32 The fact that the mecha-
nisms giving rise to these phenomena are distinct is not in it-
self a novel point, but the distinction nonetheless is routinely 
overlooked in the SEP literature.33 
The problem of sunk costs is not confined to the standards 
context, or even to patents. It arises whenever a transaction is 
subject to “durable investments in transaction-specific human 
or physical assets” made by at least one party.34 For conven-
ience, we will refer to transaction-specific investments as “sunk 
costs,” where the transaction specificity is left implicit. If the 
rights of the party who has made asset-specific investments are 
not fully defined prior to those investments being made (“ex 
ante”), that party may be subject to having the terms of the 
transaction (re-)negotiated in a way that allows the counter-
party to capture some part of the value of the sunk costs.35 
 
 31. See Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 612–14. 
 32. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Sidak, supra note 14, at 1022; supra text accompanying note 18. 
 34. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPI-
TALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 61 (1985). 
 35. See id. at 64–67 (developing the theory of opportunism based on asset-
specificity as an explanation for vertical integration, and noting that in the 
long-term the fact that supply arrangements need to adapt to changing envi-
ronmental conditions implies that the terms of a contractual supply agreement 
cannot be fully negotiated ex ante). See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The 
Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. 
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An example of this phenomenon in the non-SEP patent 
context is provided by Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production 
Co.36 The invention at issue related to a method for installing 
the foundation for an oil drilling platform.37 Shell had built 
such a platform but was found to have infringed Riles’ patent 
when it placed the foundations.38 The value of the patented 
method over alternative noninfringing methods was roughly 
$350,000.39 Accordingly, had the parties negotiated a license ex 
ante, before work on the foundations had commenced, Shell 
would not have been willing to pay more than that amount for 
the right to use the patented method. Once the foundations 
were in place, the platform was built on top at a cost of $84 mil-
lion.40 Had an injunction been available to enjoin the use of the 
platform in consequence of the infringement, Shell would have 
been willing to pay more than $84,000,000 for the right to use 
the invention, even though the value of the patented invention 
itself was only the $350,000 cost advantage it provided over the 
best available alternative.41 This potential to capture some of 
the infringer’s sunk costs is what we mean by “sunk costs 
holdup.”42 
 
ECON. REV. 112 (1971) (discussing vertical integration in a firm context). 
 36. Riles v. Shell Expl. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 37. Id. at 1305. 
 38. Id. at 1306. 
 39. See id. at 1313 (noting Shell’s evidence to that effect). The evidence 
was contested, but for purposes of this example it is sufficient that it is plausi-
ble that the value of the invention as compared with the alternative is sub-
stantially less than the value of the platform itself. 
 40. See id. at 1311. 
 41. This assumes the project would be profitable even using the alterna-
tive technology, so that walking away entirely does not make sense. In that 
case, licensing saves the $84,000,000 cost of a new platform, plus the cost of 
placing new foundations with non-infringing technology. 
 42. More precisely, what we refer to in the text above as “sunk costs 
holdup” arises when the patentee armed with an injunction can extract the 
user’s sunk costs plus the opportunity cost of not having chosen a 
noninfringing alternative ex ante. For a formal analysis, see Norman 
Siebrasse & Thomas Cotter, Why Switching Costs Are Irrelevant to Patent 
Holdup, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Sept. 24, 2015), http:// 
comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2015/09/why-switching-costs-are 
-irrelevant-to_24.html. For other illustrative examples of sunk costs holdup, 
see Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of 
FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 538–41 (2013); Farrell et al., su-
pra note 17, at 616; Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Preventing Patent Hold Up: An 
Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 
37 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 455–57 (2009); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2001–
02. 
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In practice, U.S. courts can reduce the risk of holdup by ex-
ercising their discretion to deny injunctive relief in cases like 
Riles.43 Note, however, that if the court were to award (or the 
parties were to negotiate) a reasonable royalty based on the 
amount that a patentee would be able to extract if armed with 
an injunction, the holdup problem would re-emerge. For this 
reason, the reasonable royalty should be (and is) assessed by 
means of an ex ante hypothetical negotiation, which is assumed 
to take place before the user has incurred any sunk costs. 
Network value appropriation, by contrast, depends on net-
work effects. Network effects arise when the value a user de-
rives from consumption of a good increases with the number of 
other agents consuming the good.44 Communication technolo-
gies are a classic example: the more people that have tele-
phones, the more valuable a telephone is to any given person.45 
While network effects may arise in the absence of standards, 
and de facto standards may arise as a consequence of network 
effects even in the absence of formal standards, a major reason 
for the existence of formal standards is to allow the market to 
coordinate on a single technology in order to reap the benefits 
of network externalities.46 Consequently, formal standards are 
normally associated with network effects. 
When network effects are significant, adoption of a stan-
dard increases the value of the market by enabling parties to 
coordinate on a common technology.47 Prior to standardization, 
no single patentee acting independently can capture any part of 
the value derived from standardization, absent foreknowledge 
that its patent (as opposed to someone else’s) will be selected 
 
 43. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Also, on the facts in Riles, the Federal Circuit held 
that Shell could not be enjoined from using the platform on the basis of the 
infringement of the method patent, because any injunction must be tailored to 
the specific infringement, though this particular response will not be generally 
applicable. 298 F.3d at 1311–12. Applying a well-established rule, the court in 
Riles also held damages in the form of a reasonable royalty must be based on a 
hypothetical negotiation taking place ex ante, before any asset-specific in-
vestments are made, precisely so that the patentee is prevented from captur-
ing any of the holdup value associated with the asset-specific investments 
made by the infringer. See id. at 1313. On the ex ante hypothetical negotia-
tion, see generally Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15. 
 44. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competi-
tion, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 434. 
 47. See id. 
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for inclusion in the standard.48 After standardization, however, 
a patentee whose technology is included in the standard can ex-
tract a royalty that reflects the widespread use of that technol-
ogy due to network effects.49 We refer to the ability of the pat-
entee to capture the value added by standardization as 
“network value appropriation.” As with sunk costs holdup, a 
patentee armed with an injunction can extract more from a 
user ex post than it would have been able to extract ex ante (be-
fore the sunk costs were incurred or the standard adopted). 
Sunk costs holdup and network value appropriation often 
occur together, because the adoption of a particular standard 
often requires (or at least invites) technology-specific invest-
ments. For this reason, and because both phenomena enable 
patent owners to extract higher royalties ex post than they 
would have been able to extract ex ante, they often are treated 
as a single problem warranting the same solution. For example, 
in an influential paper Daniel G. Swanson and William J. 
Baumol propose that a (F)RAND royalty is one that approxi-
mates the outcome of an ex ante auction in which patents com-
pete to be included in the standard.50 At the conclusion of such 
an auction, each “winning” patent would be entitled to a royalty 
equal to its incremental value over the next-best alternative 
that was available ex ante.51 At first blush, this “incremental ex 
ante” approach seems appealing because it evokes the widely 
accepted principle that reasonable royalty awards should equal 
the amount to which a willing licensor and licensee would have 
agreed ex ante—before the patent was infringed or, in the pre-
sent context, before the standard was adopted—in view of the 
advantages of the patented technology over other alternatives.52 
 
 48. See id. at 435. 
 49. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION 7 (2007), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/ 
2007/07/11/222655.pdf. 
 50. Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondis-
criminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market 
Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6 (2005); see also Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 
14, at 688–93 (extending the Swanson-Baumol model). 
 51. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 15–21. 
 52. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (“[T]he hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing li-
censee’ approach[ ] attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties 
would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before 
infringement began[, recreating] as best as possible . . . the ex ante licensing 
negotiation scenario and . . . resulting agreement.”); Georgia-Pac. Co. v. U.S. 
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As Swanson and Baumol argue, this approach would prevent 
SEP owners from engaging in patent “holdup” by demanding ex 
post royalties that are higher than the royalties to which they 
would have agreed at an ex ante auction.53 But the approach 
treats both network value appropriation and sunk costs holdup 
in the same way. Thus, while Swanson and Baumol explicitly 
identify what we are referring to as sunk costs holdup and net-
work value appropriation as distinct mechanisms by which an 
SSO’s selection of a patent “may have economic effects that 
convert a previously competitive technology market into one 
that is subject ex post to market or monopoly power,”54 they 
view the two phenomena as giving rise to a unified problem, 
namely “the problem of ex post market power.”55 
 
Plywood Co., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other 
grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). In the SEP context, courts have begun to 
shift the time frame for the hypothetical negotiations, from just before the pa-
tent was infringed to just before the standard was adopted. See In re Innovatio 
IP Ventures, LLC. Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *19 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Microsoft Co. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 
WL 2111217, at *19 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 
2015); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 53. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 10–11 (“If the primary goal of 
obtaining RAND licensing commitments is to prevent IP holders from setting 
royalties that exercise market power created by standardization, then the con-
cept of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for purposes of RAND licensing must be defined 
and implemented by reference to ex ante competition, i.e., competition in ad-
vance of standard selection.”). 
 54. Id. at 9–10. 
 55. Id. at 15. Some other work similarly specifically identifies both sunk 
costs holdup and network value appropriation as distinct phenomena. For ex-
ample, a joint report of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission explicitly distinguishes what we have called sunk costs holdup 
and network value appropriation, but then treats them as a single problem 
creating a distinction between “the licensing terms a patent holder could ob-
tain solely based on the merits of its technology and the terms that it could 
obtain because its technology was included in the standard.” U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 49, at 38–39 & n.25. More com-
monly, however, the two phenomena are not explicitly distinguished. Some 
authors simply define holdup as “a demand for higher royalties or other more 
costly licensing terms after the standard is implemented than could have been 
obtained before the standard was chosen.” Request for Comments and An-
nouncement of Workshop on Standard-Setting Issues, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,036 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n May 13, 2011). Others use similar terms that encompass 
both sunk costs holdup and network value appropriation. Indeed, most of the 
articles referring to patent holdup provide examples that are specific to sunk 
costs holdup alone. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Uni-
fied Framework for RAND and Other Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1451, 1487 (2015); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2001–02. We 
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Treating sunk costs holdup and network value appropria-
tion alike would not be problematic if they gave rise to the 
same functional problem; we do not dispute that both phenom-
ena allow an SEP owner to charge more after the standard is 
adopted than it could have charged ex ante. We nevertheless 
claim that “holdup” in this sense alone is not a problem. More 
precisely, sunk costs holdup results in inefficient user and pat-
entee behavior.56 However, network value appropriation has no 
static efficiency implications beyond those that arise from the 
above-marginal cost pricing that is fundamental to the patent 
system and is actually desirable from a dynamic efficiency per-
spective. Consequently, to treat them together is to conflate two 
functionally different issues. 
An example is useful to understand our objection. Consider 
a stylized wireless local area network (WLAN) technology. As-
sume that there are network externalities, so that the more us-
ers there are of a particular Wi-Fi technology, the more any in-
dividual user will be willing to pay to license that technology. 
To isolate the issue of network value appropriation, assume 
that only one patented technology is required to implement the 
Wi-Fi technology (which allows us to ignore both royalty stack-
ing and the problem of apportionment). Assume further that 
the user’s marginal cost of implementing Wi-Fi technology, 
apart from any royalty, is negligible.57 This allows us to ignore 
the problem of sunk costs for the moment. Assume that all us-
ers are identical, so that the “nondiscriminatory” part of the 
FRAND requirement need not be addressed. Also assume that 
 
do not disagree with these papers’ conclusions that sunk costs holdup should 
be avoided. Our argument is simply that standardization gives rise to another 
phenomenon, network value appropriation, which does not threaten the same 
inefficiencies as sunk costs holdup. 
 56. There is a lively debate as to how serious the sunk costs problem in 
fact is in the context of SEPs. Compare, e.g., Alexander Galetovic et al., An 
Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
549, 550 (arguing that patent holdup is not a serious problem), with Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 5, at 2025–35 (arguing that patent holdup is a serious 
problem). By saying the problem of sunk costs holdup is “real,” we do not mean 
to be taking any position on this empirical question. We mean only that the 
problem can arise, and must be addressed, even though the ultimate conclu-
sion may be that in practice it is not sufficiently serious to warrant a specific 
legal response. 
 57. Perhaps all of the competing technologies are embodied on an easily 
removable chip, similar to a cell phone SIM card. This is itself inexpensive 
apart from any royalties associated with the embodied technology, so that 
switching from one technology to another is simply a matter of switching the 
card. 
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the technology has no other application so if it is not incorpo-
rated into the patent it is worthless. This means we do not need 
to consider the patentee’s incentive to participate, because the 
patentee’s outside option is always less than (or at most, equal 
to) the value of participating. Finally, assume that the pat-
entee’s marginal cost of implementing the technology is also 
zero. This simplifies the numerical examples by fixing the 
minimum royalty a patentee is willing to accept at zero. 
In Scenario 1 the market is mature, but fragmented: there 
are ten firms that have developed and patented WLAN tech-
nology, A, B, . . . I, J, all of which are equally good. Each of the 
ten technologies has been adopted by one hundred users who 
use it in isolated networks, such as within a single firm. Each 
user would be willing to pay up to $10 annually for a license to 
the patented technology it has adopted, but the users and the 
patentees have equal bargaining power, so each user has li-
censed the technology from its respective patentee for $5 annu-
ally and each patentee receives $500.58 The total consumer sur-
plus is $5000 and the total royalty income received by all the 
patentees is $5000, so the total social value of WLAN in the 
fragmented market is $10,000. While WLAN is useful in the 
isolated networks, it would be even more useful if standardized, 
so that individual users could use their WLAN not just at their 
own office, but also at outside meetings and coffee shops. Each 
of the thousand users would be willing to pay $100 annually for 
exactly the same technology they are currently using if all 
other users were also using the same technology. Also because 
the technologies are all equally good and switching costs are 
negligible, any user would be happy to adopt any of the ten 
technologies if everyone else did so as well. Coordination prob-
lems are all that is stopping a standard from emerging. An SSO 
is set up and solves the coordination problem by choosing tech-
nology A, which is then adopted by all users. The total annual 
social value of WLAN technology is now $100,000. 
 
 58. This reflects the usual view that the royalty will fall in the bargaining 
range defined by the patentee’s marginal cost, which we assume for conven-
ience to be zero, and the user’s maximum willingness to pay, which is deter-
mined by the value of the invention as compared with the best alternative 
(which, in this example, we have assumed to be $10). A $5 royalty, which falls 
in the middle of the bargaining range, would be the Nash Bargaining Solution 
if the parties have equal bargaining power. However, nothing in our analysis 
turns on the Nash Bargaining Solution; any other number in the bargaining 
range would serve equally well. 
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If patentee A, whose technology was adopted as the stan-
dard, was able to obtain an injunction against any party using 
the standard, A would be able to extract up to $100 from each 
user. Patentee A could not extract more, because a user would 
prefer to pay $10 to use a non-standard technology within its 
firm, rather than pay more than $100 to use the standard tech-
nology anywhere. But the user would strictly prefer to adopt 
the standard technology A for any royalty less than $100. The 
exact amount of the license will depend on the relative bargain-
ing power of the parties. If the parties have the same bargain-
ing power as in the fragmented market, A would be able to li-
cense the same technology to each user for $50 annually, for a 
total of $50,000, even though before standardization it was only 
able to charge $5 to its own users, for a total of $500.59 
As discussed above, it has become a commonplace to state 
that A is entitled to the (incremental) “value of the patented 
technology” itself, as contrasted with the value that arises from 
standardization, but the cases do not specify exactly what is 
meant by either concept.60 The value of standardization is pre-
sumably the difference between the value of the standard and 
the value of the patented technology, but both of these concepts 
are ambiguous. The “value of the standard” in the present ex-
ample could be understood as the $100,000 social value of the 
standardized technology in Scenario 1, or it might be under-
stood as the amount that a patentee armed with an injunction 
could actually extract (which, if the parties had equal bargain-
ing power, would be $50,000). The value of the invention could 
be understood as the $500 that patentee A was in fact receiving 
annually prior to standardization. Or it might be the ex ante 
consumer surplus, which is $1000 in our example. It might 
even be argued that the value of the technology is equal to the 
full value of the market to all patentees prior to standardiza-
tion ($5000), or even the full social value prior to standardiza-
tion ($10,000), based on the view that WLAN technology is 
 
 59. Since bargaining power may reflect risk-aversion, it is not strictly cor-
rect to assume that the parties will have the same bargaining power in the 
standardized market as in the fragmented market. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, THE 
CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER 80–81 (1989). We assume 
that the bargaining power remains the same simply for numerical conven-
ience. Nothing turns on the point; our argument turns only on the point that 
the patentee whose technology is selected as the standard is able to extract 
more ex post, in the standardized market, than it could have demanded ex 
ante, in the fragmented market. 
 60. See supra notes 8–9. 
  
1178 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1159 
 
worth that much even if not standardized. Alternatively, we 
might take it to be the amount that patentee A would have 
been willing to accept in an ex ante negotiation between the 
parties in order to be selected as the standard. This amount 
depends on the details of the hypothetical negotiation. As we 
will see, in Swanson & Baumol’s model this would be $0 on the 
facts in Scenario 1.61 Whether the value of the patented tech-
nology is taken to be $0, $500, $1000, $5000 or $10,000, does 
not affect our basic point. We will argue that even a substan-
tially higher royalty—say, one in which the patentee and the 
users share equally in the additional value created by stan-
dardization—could be considered fair and reasonable. With 
that said, the ambiguity as to what actually constitutes the 
value of standardization signals an important conceptual prob-
lem, to which we will return in due course. 
Now consider Scenario 2, in which initially there is no 
WLAN at all. The same firm A as in Scenario 1 develops and 
patents the same technology A, but in Scenario 2, no other firm 
develops a competing technology. As in Scenario 1, each user’s 
maximum willingness to pay for a standardized technology is 
$100, but in this scenario technology A is the de facto standard, 
so users are willing to pay up to that amount to license from 
patentee A when it first develops the technology. After bargain-
ing, the parties agree to a royalty of $50.62 The result is that in 
Scenario 2, A will reap $50,000 of the $100,000 social value of 
the de facto standardized WLAN market. 
In Scenario 2 we would not say there is anything wrong 
with A capturing a substantial part of the social value of the 
technology.63 On the contrary, this is a classic example of the 
patent system working the way it should: the patentee invents 
a valuable product, charges what the market will bear and is 
rewarded accordingly. Even if subsequent patentees B through 
 
 61. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19 (describing a formula on 
recurring costs and licensing fees); see also Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, 
at 690. 
 62. Our analysis depends only on the point that the parties will split the 
incremental value of the invention between them, and for a very wide range of 
plausible outcomes the patentee will receive more than $10 per user. A royalty 
of $10, $1, or $0, which are the salient points in the context of Scenario 1, are 
entirely arbitrary in the context of Scenario 2. 
 63. Note that this does not mean that A captures the entire value of the 
invention or the entire consumer surplus. Presumably there will be some con-
sumer surplus accruing to the users, but we do not normally worry about 
whether there is consumer surplus or not. 
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J then develop their equivalent alternative technology (call this 
Scenario 2B), no user will be willing to adopt that technology, 
because it offers no technical advantage over technology A, and 
the network effect value will be lost if they switch.64 In effect, 
the only difference between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is that in 
Scenario 2 historical accident solved the coordination problem, 
while it needed to be solved by an SSO in Scenario 1.65 
There is a puzzle here. Why should it be a paradigmatic 
example of a properly functioning patent system for patentee A 
to receive a royalty of $50 per user in Scenario 2, and yet a ba-
sic principle of FRAND royalties that the same patentee with 
the same technology should not be entitled to more than $10 
per user, perhaps even less, in Scenario 1? 
One obvious difference between the cases is that in Sce-
nario 2, it is intuitive to say that the entire value of the market 
was created by patentee A, while in Scenario 1, the value of the 
standardized market was evidently created by standardization, 
not by patentee A, whose technology was selected arbitrarily. 
From a fairness perspective, it might seem that in Scenario 2, 
patentee A is deservedly capturing the value of its own inven-
tion, while in Scenario 1 it is undeservedly capturing the value 
of standardization. But if we look at matters from the perspec-
tive of the users, there is an equally intuitive counterargument: 
it seems unfair that the users capture almost the entire value 
of the technology in Scenario 1, when they have contributed 
nothing at all to the development of that technology.66 
 
 64. Even if B offers to license for $0, users will not switch, because their 
individual surplus will be only $10 (the value of using an isolated network), 
whereas the user surplus is $50 if they license the de facto standard technolo-
gy from A for $50. At most, the ex post competition will ensure that A cannot 
demand more than $90 for its technology. 
 65. See Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the 
Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 794 (2014) 
(noting the functional equivalent between standard setting through an SSO 
and through a “standards war”). 
 66. Cf. Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Logic and Limits of 
Ex Ante Competition in a Standard Setting Environment, 3 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 79, 93 (2007) (noting that consumers reap the benefits of standard-
ization). 
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II.  CRITIQUE OF THE AUCTION MODEL   
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
As noted, Swanson and Baumol identify both sunk costs 
holdup and network value appropriation as creating ex post 
market power.67 They perceive this as a problem (for reasons we 
discuss below), and they provide a single response, namely an 
auction model in which patentees bid to be selected for the 
standard by making offers, via the SSO, to downstream users 
who then select the bid which provides the end user with the 
greatest net profit.68 The patentee with the winning bid is se-
lected to be part of the standard. In the auction model, because 
the parties bid before the standard is adopted and are then 
locked in to their bid, ex ante competition between the parties 
constrains the price that can be charged ex post.69 The basic re-
sult of the auction model, which Swanson and Baumol propose 
as a “reasonable” royalty for FRAND purposes,70 is that the pa-
tent will be licensed at a fee “equal to the recurring costs of li-
censing, plus the difference in value between the best and next-
best IP alternatives.”71 This result was reflected in the expert 
testimony that Judge Robart adopted in Microsoft v. Motorola: 
Dr. Schmalensee has likewise acknowledged that, in the event of a 
dispute regarding RAND royalties, “[t]he various parties could make 
their cases in court for the relative value of their IP contributions to 
the standard, in the context of other options considered during the 
standard’s early development phases. If a component had multiple al-
ternatives before the standard was settled, its incremental contribu-
tion, properly measured, may be close or equal to zero.”72 
 
 67. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 15–21 (explaining the ex 
ante auction model). As in our examples, Swanson and Baumol assume that 
the standard involves the choice of a single technology. Cf. Layne-Farrar et al., 
supra note 14, at 688 (extending the auction model to the case of multi-patent 
standards).  
 69. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 21 (stating that ex ante 
competition can protect market from opportunism). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 686 (summarizing the Swanson 
& Baumol model). 
 72. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (citing Microsoft’s expert), aff ’d, 
795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); see also id. at *13 (“If alternatives available to 
the patented technology would have provided the same or similar technical 
contribution to the standard, the actual value provided by the patented tech-
nology is its incremental contribution. . . . Thus, comparison of the patented 
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It is this proposition, that an upper bound on a FRAND royalty 
is the incremental value of the patent as compared with the al-
ternatives, including patented alternatives, before the standard 
was settled, that we challenge. 
To see why, consider again our Scenario 1, where the al-
ternative technologies are equally good and there are no recur-
ring costs of licensing. In the auction to be part of the standard, 
the payoff to any unsuccessful patentee is zero, so if one pa-
tentee bids $1, another patentee would be willing to bid 99¢ ra-
ther than lose everything. In the end, the auction will bid the 
fee down to the patentee’s marginal cost, which is zero in our 
scenario. Thus, in this scenario, the winning bid in the auction 
model would be $0.73 By contrast, in Scenario 2, patentee A will 
capture the full value of the market, with a royalty of $100 per 
user. Patentee A will offer a royalty of $100 because it knows 
that is has no competition, and that offer will be accepted be-
cause each user strictly prefers to pay $100 than to do without 
the standardized WLAN technology entirely.74 As Swanson and 
Baumol say, the patentee captures the difference in value be-
tween the best and the next best alternatives.75 When there is 
only one candidate technology, the alternative is the prior 
technology—in this case, presumably a combination of cell 
phones and wired internet access—and the patentee can cap-
ture the full value of the standard. This result illustrates that 
under the auction model there is no general principle that the 
patentee cannot capture any part of the value of the standard. 
Indeed, under the auction model the patentee in Scenario 2 ac-
tually captures the entire value of the standardization. 
 
technology to the alternatives that the SSO could have written into the stand-
ard is a consideration in determining a RAND royalty.” (citing Microsoft’s ex-
pert Kevin Murphy)). 
 73. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 690 (referring to Case 1); 
Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19 (assuming incremental c = 0). 
 74. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 690–91 (referring to Case 2). 
Layne-Farrar et al.’s Case 2 considers a two-patent standard with perfect 
competition ex ante for one of the components and no competition for the oth-
er, with the result that the patent holder for the component with no competi-
tion captures the entire value of the market. Our simplified scenario of a 
standard with a single patented technology is a special case in which there is 
perfect competition for one component because that component is not patent-
ed. Similarly, our scenario can be considered a special case of Layne-Farrar et 
al.’s Case 4, in which there is no competition for either of the components, in 
which case again the patentees will capture the entire value of the market. See 
id. at 691–92. 
 75. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19, 23. 
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In response, one might argue that, even if patentee A cap-
tures the value of the standard in Scenario 2, it does not cap-
ture the value of standardization, because all of the value of the 
standard is embodied in Patent A. In a slightly more complex 
example, however, the auction model will allow patentee A to 
capture the value of standardization. Suppose that the stand-
ard in question requires two patented technologies for its im-
plementation, and there is perfect competition ex ante for one 
of the components and no competition for the other. That is, 
there is no substitute for technology A, but X, Y, and Z are per-
fect substitutes for one another. While A is worthless on its 
own, any pair (A, X), (A, Y) or (A, Z) will be equally effective. 
The result of an ex ante auction in that case is that patentee A 
will capture the entire value of the standardized market, while 
X, Y, or Z—whichever is selected—will get a royalty of zero.76 
This occurs even though one of X, Y, or Z is also necessary to 
the standard, such that A alone is worth much less prior to 
standardization. In this case, under the auction model A will 
capture the value of the standard even though that value is 
created by standardization. 
These examples illustrate that, under the incremental ex 
ante approach, there is no general principle precluding the pa-
tentee from obtaining the value of the standard, or the value of 
standardization. Whether the patentee captures all or part of 
the value of standardization depends on the nature of the ex 
ante competition.77 Indeed, “the value of standardization” has 
no independent definition under the auction model. It is de-
fined only implicitly, as the difference between the value of the 
standard and the value to which the patentees are entitled un-
der the auction model. The fundamental principle in the auc-
tion model is that the patentee is not entitled to more than the 
value of the invention, where, crucially, the value of the inven-
tion is defined by the state of competition in the ex ante auc-
tion. 
But is that a sound principle? On the one hand, it is intui-
tively appealing to say that the patentee is not entitled to more 
than the value of its invention; however, some of that appeal is 
 
 76. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 690–91 (referring to Case 2). 
 77. Thus, if there are multiple technologies and there is imperfect compe-
tition for one of the technologies (that is, at least two technologies that could 
be used, but one is better than the other), the superior patentee captures a 
part of the value of standardization. See id. at 691 (referring to Case 3). The 
same is true when there is no competition. 
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lost under the technical definition provided by the auction 
model. We noted the ambiguity in the intuitive concept of the 
value of the invention in our Scenario 1, and the auction model 
resolved this ambiguity. But on the facts of Scenario 1, the val-
ue of the invention is zero under the implicit definition provid-
ed by auction model. This means that in Scenario 1, where 
there was in fact a fragmented market pre-standardization, in 
which patentee A charged $5 per user, after patentee A was 
“lucky” enough to have its technology selected as the standard 
the “fair and reasonable” royalty it would be entitled to charge 
would drop to zero. Thus, while it seems intuitive to say that a 
patentee should not be able to charge more than “the value of 
the invention,” it does not seem quite so intuitive to say that 
“the value of the invention,” and hence a fair royalty—which, 
after all, should be fair to the patentee as well as the licensee—
should be zero in Scenario 1. 
This counterintuitive result turns on the principle that the 
patentee’s return should be constrained by ex ante competition. 
Though the principle also seems very intuitive, we will argue 
that it is unsound nonetheless, at least as embodied in the auc-
tion model. Ex ante competition is not desirable in and of itself, 
after all; it is desirable only to the extent that it promotes static 
and dynamic efficiency. We will argue that the auction model 
wrongly conflates network value appropriation and sunk costs 
holdup. An ex ante analysis is necessary to prevent sunk costs 
holdup, which has adverse efficiency implications. But the auc-
tion aspect of the model, which avoids network value appropri-
ation, is unnecessary in terms of static efficiency and unsound 
in terms of dynamic efficiency. 
B. STATIC EFFICIENCY 
First off, it is important to recognize that network value 
appropriation has no static efficiency implications, or at least 
none beyond the implications of above marginal cost pricing 
that is inherent in the patent system. The payment from the 
user to the patentee is a mere transfer, as illustrated by the 
contrast between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. In Scenario 2, 
whether bargaining between the patentee and the users results 
in a royalty of $10 per user, or $50 per user, or $100 per user, 
the users will not choose another technology, avoid investing 
altogether, or otherwise change their behavior, so long as the 
royalty is less than $100. True, the conclusion that no user will 
change her behavior is an artifact of our unrealistic assumption 
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that all the users have identical demand functions. More realis-
tically, some users will be priced out of the market at higher 
royalty rates. But this is so whether there is a single patentee 
charging what the market will bear for its invention (Scenario 
2), or a post-standardization patentee armed with an injunction 
(Scenario 1). The efficiency implications of allowing the success-
ful patentee to capture some part of the market post-
standardization are only those which are inherent in the above 
marginal cost pricing that is essential to the patent system. 
In contrast, it is well understood that sunk costs holdup 
does have efficiency implications.78 A patentee with an injunc-
tion can extract some portions of the user’s sunk costs, in addi-
tion to the cost saving or profit boost accruing from the use of 
the invention as compared with the best alternative. While that 
immediate payment is only a transfer, the result of the pay-
ment is that an undertaking that would have been profitable 
for the user if it had licensed ex ante may be less profitable or 
even unprofitable if it has to license ex post. A transaction in 
which sunk costs holdup is a possibility is, ex ante, riskier than 
one in which it is not, all else being equal. The increased risk 
will cause the user to entirely avoid at least some transactions 
in which there is a possibility of sunk costs holdup occurring. In 
contrast to network value appropriation, with sunk costs 
holdup the amount the user is willing to pay ex ante is lower 
than the amount that the user would have been willing to pay 
ex post. It is that differential between ex post and ex ante value 
to the user that causes the user to inefficiently change its be-
havior. 
To summarize, the static efficiency implications of sunk 
costs holdup and network value appropriation are very differ-
ent, because with sunk costs holdup, the amount the user is 
willing to pay ex post is higher than it would have been willing 
to pay ex ante,79 while with network value appropriation the 
amount that the user is willing to pay ex post is exactly the 
same as it would have been willing to pay ex ante. 
Swanson and Baumol specifically identify the allocative in-
efficiency implications of sunk costs incurred by users,80 but de-
spite having identified the network effect as a mechanism giv-
 
 78. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 615 (explaining that users 
may make inefficient investments to protect themselves from possible patent 
holdups). 
 79. See supra note 42. 
 80. See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 37. 
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ing rise to holdup, they never specifically identify its efficiency 
implications.81 By omission, they imply that the same rationale 
applies to both phenomena, thus wrongly conflating sunk costs 
holdup and network value appropriation. Any royalty that is 
less than the incremental value to the user of the patented 
technology, excluding sunk costs, will satisfy allocative efficien-
cy, at least within the broad bounds inherent in the above mar-
ginal cost pricing that is essential to the patent system. 
This means that a royalty based on the auction model is 
not necessary for allocative efficiency. This may seem to be a 
strong claim, given that Layne-Farrar et al. described the auc-
tion model as “rooted in the concept of economic efficiency,”82 
and given that Swanson and Baumol assert that the outcome of 
the auction process and a license fee based on the efficient 
component pricing rule “will normally be the same.”83 However, 
efficient component pricing merely requires that the price that 
a patentee implicitly charges to itself for the use of its IP, 
which is the difference between the final product price and the 
incremental price of the other inputs, is equal to the price the 
patentee charges to licensees who are competing in the product 
market. This is, as Swanson and Baumol argue, a reasonable 
interpretation of the “nondiscriminatory” branch of the FRAND 
requirement.84 The “efficient” aspect of ECPR85 is that if this 
rule were not observed, a market might be captured by a manu-
facturer facing a lower IP cost (a licensee, or, more likely, the 
patentee itself) even though it had a higher incremental cost of 
other inputs, resulting in an inefficient use of non-IP resources. 
However, this in itself says nothing about marginal cost pricing 
of the IP. If the patentee charges itself an implicit price which 
is greater than its marginal cost of using the IP—in order to re-
coup its R&D investment, as per standard patent theory—there 
is nothing inefficient under ECPR about the patentee charging 
 
 81. Similarly, Farrell et al. correctly note that what we are referring to as 
sunk costs holdup is undesirable because it causes the user to inefficiently 
change its behavior. However, Farrell et al. then proceed to assert that what 
we refer to as network value appropriation exacerbates holdup, without identi-
fying how it gives rise to either static or dynamic inefficiency. Farrell et al., 
supra note 17, at 603–16. 
 82. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 685. 
 83. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 37–39; see also Layne-Farrar et 
al., supra note 14, at 687 (making this point about Swanson & Baumol’s anal-
ysis). 
 84. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 37–39. 
 85. Id. 
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the same above marginal cost price to licensees, because the 
party with the lowest non-IP costs will still be able to capture 
the market. 
After elaborating on the nondiscriminatory aspect of 
ECPR, with which we have no quarrel, Swanson and Baumol 
then assert that the ECPR-determined license fee and the roy-
alty emerging from the auction process “will normally be the 
same.”86 But what they actually show is that the outcome of an 
auction process, namely incremental cost pricing, also satisfies 
the ECPR criterion.87 They do not show that any price which 
satisfies ECPR will necessarily, or usually, be the outcome of 
an auction process. Thus they do not show that the outcome of 
the auction model and ECPR are “normally the same.”88 They 
show only that the outcome of the auction model is one possible 
royalty in the class of royalties that satisfies ECPR. 
In summary, Swanson and Baumol never show that it is 
inefficient to allow the patentee to capture part of the value of 
standardization. Indeed, as we have seen, their auction model 
does allow the patentee to capture the value of standardization 
in some circumstances. Swanson and Baumol show that the 
auction pricing mechanism is sufficient to avoid inefficiencies 
associated with sunk costs and that it is nondiscriminatory, or 
efficient, in the ECPR sense.89 But they do not show that the 
auction model is necessary to avoid inefficiencies associated 
with sunk costs or satisfy efficient component pricing. Moreo-
ver, while they identify network value appropriation as a 
mechanism giving rise to holdup,90 they never specifically iden-
tify any inefficiencies associated with that mechanism. Nor are 
we aware of any other scholarship that purports to demon-
strate, rather than merely assert, that allowing the patentee to 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 38, where Swanson & Baumol argue that when faced with 
ample ex ante competition an IP owner cannot charge a price above marginal 
cost, “at least if the technology owner is effectively constrained ex post by pre-
selection commitments.” In effect, this assumption incorporates the auction 
pricing model into the ECPR formula, with the result that the ECPR formula 
reduces to an incremental cost royalty. However, the notion that the IP owner 
is constrained by pre-selection commitments does not rest on any principle of 
efficient component pricing, which requires only that the royalty charged by 
the patentee to others is the same as the implicit price charged to itself. If that 
assumption is relaxed, the link between ECPR and the auction model is bro-
ken. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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capture part of the value of standardization results in static in-
efficiency. 
C. INCENTIVES TO INVENT / DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
Next, consider the effect of the auction model on patentee 
behavior. The first point to note is that the auction model is 
purely static; it does not consider dynamic effects on the incen-
tive to innovate. This is what gives rise to the counterintuitive 
result that the patentee in Scenario 1 is entitled to nothing, de-
spite having invented a valuable technology. 
Swanson and Baumol acknowledge this, noting that “we 
would not expect ‘reasonable’ royalties to be equal to zero.”91 
But in their model, royalties will exceed zero only because of 
what they describe as “a plethora of ongoing incremental costs” 
related to the licensing of IP, which, “in addition to involving 
costs of negotiation, contracting, accounting, monitoring, and 
auditing, also frequently involves the costs of instruction, train-
ing, and 24-hour assistance.”92 These costs are no more than the 
marginal costs of licensing and supporting, or at most improv-
ing, on the initial innovation. Thus, while Swanson and 
Baumol present this as a dynamic model, it takes no account of 
the investment needed to induce the invention in the first place. 
Their model explicitly assumes that “all investments in R&D by 
the patent holders already have been sunk and patent holders 
do not anticipate incurring any future costs as a consequence of 
licensing their patent.”93 They subsequently relax this assump-
tion, but only by allowing for recurring costs, as just de-
scribed.94 A return for such ongoing costs alone is not sufficient 
to provide an incentive to invent the technology which is sub-
ject to the ex ante auction in the first place.95 This is equally 
explicit in the extension by Layne-Farrar et al., which assumes 
 
 91. Id. at 22. 
 92. Id. at 22 & n.64. 
 93. Id. at 23. Indeed, Swanson & Baumol explicitly acknowledge that 
“[n]either the antitrust nor the patent laws deem it unreasonable for IP hold-
ers to seek to reap the returns that accrue ex post from the attainment of law-
fully won monopoly or market power.” Id. at 11. They go on to assert that in 
light of this limitation of antitrust and IP law, “private methods of control 
must be relied on to attempt to achieve this goal.” Id. at 12. This argument 
fails to recognize that by allowing patentees to assert lawfully won market 
power, patent law provides the incentive to invent; it is a central feature of the 
patent system, not a shortcoming that needs to be rectified. 
 94. Id. at 19. 
 95. See id. at 22. 
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that the patented technologies exist at the time of the auction 
and explicitly states that the patentee’s minimum return must 
exceed “the incremental cost of licensing its technology.”96 So, 
when there is perfect competition ex ante in the market for the 
patented invention, as in Scenario 1, “the equilibrium royalty 
rate of each component of the standard is given by the incre-
mental cost of licensing.”97 
Thus the premise of the auction model, that a fair return to 
the patentee is equal to its marginal cost of licensing, is in con-
flict with the fundamental premise of the patent system, which 
is that the recovery of incremental costs alone is not sufficient 
to induce innovation. Swanson and Baumol’s response to the 
objection that a reasonable royalty cannot be zero is to say that 
incremental costs of licensing normally exceed zero. But this 
misses the point. The (correct) intuition that a patentee’s re-
turn cannot be zero reflects the premise of the patent system 
that marginal cost pricing is insufficient to induce innovation. 
A royalty of zero is simply the most obvious example of margin-
al cost pricing.98 Swanson and Baumol address the intuition 
that a reasonable royalty should not be zero without addressing 
the substance underpinning that intuition, which is that mar-
ginal cost pricing does not provide sufficient incentive to in-
 
 96. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 689–90. 
 97. Id. at 690. Similarly, Swanson & Baumol state, “As rival IP solutions 
come closer and closer to being perfect substitutes . . . the competitive royalty 
will approach c, the incremental cost of recurring innovation and licensing ex-
penses.” Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 19. 
Layne-Farrar et al. do note one criticism of the auction model, that “effi-
ciency-based rules, which treat competitive market outcomes—even monopo-
listic ones—as optimal and ignore issues of equity, cannot be counted on to 
produce outcomes that are fair or reasonable.” Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 
14. Our critique of Swanson & Baumol is very different; our objection is that 
their efficiency-based approach considers only static efficiency, not dynamic 
efficiency. 
Kieff & Layne-Farrar make essentially the same point we do, noting that 
“strict” interpretations of the incremental value rule, in which a patent holder 
is entitled only to the incremental value of its invention over the best patented 
alternative, “focus solely on the ex post problem,” and ignores the need to pro-
vide an incentive to invent. F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Ef-
fects from Different Approaches To Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent 
Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations, 9 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 1091, 
1120 (2013). 
 98. Also, as a practical matter, it is far from clear that the patentee’s in-
cremental costs of licensing are substantially above zero in the context of soft-
ware-implemented inventions that are common in standards. 
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vent.99 In fact, there is no good response to the substantive 
point; the auction pricing model is simply inconsistent with the 
principle that a FRAND royalty should provide an adequate in-
centive to invent. This also resolves the fairness puzzle we not-
ed earlier: the result that the patentee gets a zero royalty in 
Scenario 1 seems unfair because it is unfair. It is not only fair, 
but necessary, to allow the patentee to recover more than its 
marginal cost. 
Finally, consider the effect of sunk costs holdup on patent-
ee incentives. A disadvantage of the patent system from an in-
novation perspective is that by requiring above marginal cost 
pricing as a means of allowing the patentee to recover its sunk 
cost of invention, dissemination of the invention is restricted. 
The offsetting advantage is that the patent system gives the 
inventor high-powered incentives to pursue inventions which 
are socially useful, because the more valuable the invention to 
society, the larger the incentive.100 The incentive is high-
powered because it is the inventor’s own money, not public 
funds, which are at risk. It follows from this that the reward to 
the patentee should not be greater than the value of the inven-
tion to society, or the incentive to invent will be too large.101 If 
the patentee can extract some part of the user’s sunk costs, in 
addition to the cost saving or profit increase provided by the 
patented technology, the incentive to invent will be greater 
than the costs saving or profit advantage provided by the in-
vention, and the patent incentive will be too great.102 Thus sunk 
 
 99. See Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, FRAND Commitments and EC 
Competition Law: A Reply to Philippe Chappatte, 6 EUR. COMP. J. 129, 153 
(2010) (making this point); Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Rea-
sonable” in the Context of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 948 (2014) (same); Sidak, supra note 14, at 972, 
976–77 (same). Sidak, however, also appears to equate network value appro-
priation with holdup. See Sidak, supra note 14, at 1022 (arguing that patent-
ees should be able to recover positive “holdup value”). We resist this character-
ization. 
 100. See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus In-
tellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 530 (2001) (arguing that be-
cause a “patent effectively harnesses the private information of the innovator 
about the value of an innovation,” patent incentives may be better than prizes 
“despite the deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing”); see also Benjamin N. 
Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 999, 1016 (2014) (reviewing the debate and arguing that patents may al-
so allow inventors to resist expropriation by sub-optimal government re-
wards). 
 101. See Roin, supra note 100, at 1031–32. 
 102. See id. 
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costs holdup is dynamically inefficient as it results in excessive 
incentives to invent. 
In summary, sunk costs holdup has negative dynamic ef-
fects on both user and patentee incentives; it induces users to 
avoid making socially valuable investments that might be sub-
ject to holdup, and it induces patentees to overinvest in patents 
in order to capture user’s sunk costs. In contrast, network value 
appropriation has no negative static or dynamic effects on user 
incentives, and it has potentially positive dynamic effects on 
patentee incentives. For this reason, it is an error to treat net-
work value and sunk costs holdup as being similar in nature 
and requiring the same response. Though both phenomena 
might be described as species of “holdup” because they both en-
able patentees to extract more ex post than they could have ex-
tracted ex ante, the efficiency implications of the two phenome-
na are completely different. 
D. LEGAL OBJECTION: AUCTION VERSUS NEGOTIATION 
This brings us to our legal objection to the auction model. 
The technical reason why the patentee in Scenario 1 ends up 
with a zero royalty under the auction model is that the patent-
ee will necessarily be bid down to its minimum willingness to 
accept, namely its marginal cost, when it is bidding against an-
other patentee with equally good technology. In contrast, the 
general legal rule is that damages in the form of a reasonable 
royalty are assessed by reference to a hypothetical negotiation, 
not an auction. The difference is that in a hypothetical negotia-
tion the royalty is usually assumed to involve some split in the 
difference between the patentee’s marginal cost and the user’s 
maximum willingness to pay, so that some part of the surplus 
is captured by the patentee. A negotiation model—unlike the 
auction model—allows pricing above marginal cost, and that is 
what provides the incentive to innovate. 
In response, one might argue that the auction model really 
is necessary from a dynamic perspective. The patent incentive 
must be commensurate with the value of the technology, and 
the value of the technology is the cost saving or profit increase 
as compared with the best alternative.103 If the alternative is 
 
 103. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 
1341, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Farrell et al., supra note 17, at 611 (“Economic 
incentives generally work well when each person’s or firm’s reward for its ac-
tions is broadly commensurate with the incremental contribution of those ac-
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just as good as the patented technology, then the appropriate 
reward to the patentee is zero. It is certainly not a principle of 
the patent system that the patentee should get a reward which 
covers its sunk cost of invention; on the contrary, what makes 
patent incentives high-powered is precisely that the inventor 
will lose money if the invention does not provide a sufficient 
advantage as compared to the alternatives.104 The patentee 
must not be rewarded for re-inventing the wheel. On this ar-
gument, it seems that the incremental ex ante approach is 
sound because in Scenario 1 technology A is no better than 
technology B, C, D, and so on, and because A has not added any 
value over the alternatives, it should not be entitled to any re-
ward. 
In our view, this argument is entirely sound if the alterna-
tive is unpatented. In Scenario 1, if any of the alternative tech-
nologies are unpatented, then we entirely agree that a reason-
able royalty for patentee A should be zero, for exactly the 
reasons just discussed. This is consistent with established law. 
Whether within the SEP context or otherwise, it is clear that 
the royalty cannot exceed the incremental value of the inven-
tion over an unpatented alternative, because the unpatented 
alternative determines the user’s maximum willingness to 
pay.105 
However, the same is not true if the alternatives are pa-
tented, either as a matter of policy or as a matter of law. In the 
standards context it is entirely plausible that in practice all the 
relevant technologies will be patented, precisely because of the 
incentive provided by the prospect of being included in the 
standard.106 The same problem may also arise outside the 
standards context, and it is useful to consider how the problem 
should be treated generally, before returning to the SEP con-
text. 
Outside the SEP context, the law is not clear as to how a 
patented alternative should be treated; the limited case law in-
 
tions to total economic surplus.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Geradin, supra note 99, at 948. 
 105. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 F. Supp. 
1386, 1390–93 (N.D. Ind. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). 
 106. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: 
Some Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and 
the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1093–1110 
(2014) (discussing the competition among patentees to have their technology 
included in the standard). 
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dicates that a patented alternative that is on the market should 
be considered available at the established patented price, which 
is normally above marginal cost.107 In contrast, the auction 
model applied outside the SEP context implies that where the 
alternative is patented, the infringing user in the hypothetical 
negotiation should be imagined to play one patentee off against 
another until the patentee is haggled down to its minimum 
willingness to accept. 
We are not aware of any literature providing a thorough 
theoretical analysis of this problem, and the solution is not evi-
dent. There is no accepted theory of the portion of the surplus 
that a single patentee should be able to claim as a matter of op-
timal incentives to innovate.108 The problem of the optimal roy-
alty to a patentee in the face of competition from a patented al-
ternative is even more difficult, and we are not going to solve it 
here. It suffices to make three points, all of which turn on our 
general criticism that the auction model ignores the problem of 
the incentive to innovate which is at the heart of the patent 
system. 
First, whatever the optimal royalty in the face of a patent-
ed alternative, the marginal cost pricing implied by the auction 
model is wrong from a dynamic perspective. The fact that two 
patentees develop equivalent technology at the same time does 
not mean that neither required the lure of a patent. Viagra and 
Cialis may be equally effective in treating erectile dysfunction, 
but that does not imply that they both would have been invent-
 
 107. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 
2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (stating that the court would 
consider patented alternatives, but “that they will not drive down the royalty 
in the hypothetical negotiation by as much as technology in the public do-
main”). 
 108. While full appropriability of the social value of the invention by the 
patentee is sometimes suggested as the appropriate baseline, the optimal re-
turn is probably less than full appropriability for a variety of reasons. See 
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 100, at 535; see also YOCHAI BENKLER, 
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MAR-
KETS AND FREEDOM 37–38 (2009); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, 
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 268–71 (2007) (discussing several positive 
effects of spillovers); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. 505, 529–31 (2010) (noting several negative effects of full 
appropriability); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: 
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991) 
(discussing two major downsides to using full social value as baseline); Carl 
Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, 8 INNOVATION 
POL’Y & ECON. 111, 114–17 (highlighting the negative effects of over-
rewarding patent holders). 
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ed if pharmaceutical patents were not available. The auction 
model implies that the reasonable royalty for a user of Viagra is 
a few pennies, because in an auction a user could play Pfizer 
against Lilly to drive the royalty down to marginal cost. But 
when both alternatives are subject to a valid patent it must be 
assumed that the patentees would not have invented their 
technology unless they anticipated getting more than marginal 
cost.109 If both patentees receive a zero royalty, or close to it, 
whenever two or more equivalent technologies are invented, 
then the expected return to either will be zero, which is clearly 
insufficient to induce the invention in the first place. 
Second, the patent system does not turn on the theoretical 
return to the patentee in a bargaining model, or on the theoret-
ically optimal return to the patentee from an incentive perspec-
tive. Rather, the amount that patentees have actually been 
able to extract in real-world negotiations are the primary driv-
ers of the patent system’s incentives. By the same token, courts 
have rejected reliance on theoretical models that are not ade-
quately tied to the facts of the case.110 At least in the absence of 
a generally accepted theoretical optimum, the benchmark re-
turn should be given by comparable actual negotiations. By the 
same token, in the absence of evidence that, in the real world, 
competition among competing patentees regularly results in 
users bargaining both patentees down to their marginal cost, a 
reasonable royalty should allow a patentee competing with a 
patented alternative to recover some part of the surplus due to 
its invention. 
Further, there is no principled difference between the SEP 
context and the general patent context which justifies an auc-
tion model in the former and a negotiation model in the latter. 
The image of multiple patentees with different technologies 
competing against one another for the prize of being made part 
of the standard makes a model in which competition forces the 
patentee down to its marginal cost seem plausible in the SEP 
context. But even outside that context, when we are consider-
 
 109. This accepts the substantive law as sound, and in particular that the 
nonobviousness standard ensures that patents are granted only for inventions 
which required the lure of a patent. We doubt this is true in practice, but we 
consider it to be the appropriate assumption in the remedial context. See 
Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15, at 14 n.55. 
 110. See Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1331–34 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (rejecting an expert’s use of the Nash Bargaining Solution); Uniloc USA, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the 
twenty-five percent rule of thumb). 
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ing one patented technology that is substantially superior to an 
unpatented alternative, it is still possible in principle that the 
patentee will be haggled down to its incremental cost. Never-
theless, the law generally does not assume that the patentee 
always will be haggled down to its minimum willingness to ac-
cept. For this reason, the auction model of SEPs is inconsistent 
with the general law of reasonable royalty damages.111 
E. SHAPLEY PRICING 
Up to this point, we have argued that the auction model 
should be rejected as being unnecessary for static efficiency and 
unsound in terms of providing adequate incentives to invent. 
But are there any better alternatives? 
One alternative that remedies some of the defects of the 
auction model is Shapley pricing.112 As described by Layne-
Farrar et al., the Shapley value in the standard setting context 
can be thought of as the outcome of a process in which: 
[T]he patent owners arrive at the SSO in random order each with her 
patent in her pocket, with all possible arrival sequences equally like-
ly. Now suppose that in each sequence, each patent owner receives 
the amount by which her patent increases the value of the best 
standard that can be built from the patents that are already at the 
SSO when she arrives. That is, if the set of patents S is at the SSO 
when patent j arrives, j’s owner receives the incremental value v(Sj) 
– v(S). The Shapley value gives j the average of such contributions 
over all possible arrival sequences—each patent thus receives the av-
erage (over arrival sequences) of its marginal contribution.113 
 
 111. Another difficulty with the auction model is that expected marginal 
contribution may be different from the actual marginal contribution. For ex-
ample, as explained in Microsoft, support for video interlacing is part of the 
H.264 standard. Video interlacing was important for older technology but is 
now largely obsolete and is required largely as legacy support. Microsoft Corp. 
v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *21–22, *24 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). Suppose, however, 
that at the time the standard was developed, no one anticipated the changeo-
ver from interlacing to progressive video. Support for interlacing might have 
been considered valuable ex ante, yet, in fact, it is now used by few users. Un-
der the incremental ex ante approach, a party with patents on key interlacing 
technology might command a high royalty, even though the actual value of 
that technology to users is low. By contrast, under the contingent ex ante ap-
proach that we describe in Part III, royalties will reflect the actual value of the 
technology to the user. 
 112. Named after Lloyd S. Shapley, who introduced the concept. L.S. Shap-
ley, A Value for n-Person Games, in 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF 
GAMES 307 (H.W. Kuhn & A.W. Tucker eds., 1953). 
 113. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 695; see, e.g., H.P. Young, Indi-
vidual Contribution and Just Compensation, in THE SHAPLEY VALUE: ESSAYS 
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That is, the return to any patentee is the expected amount 
that its patent would contribute to the total value of the stand-
ard. So, in our Scenario 1, each of the ten patentees with equal-
ly good WLAN technology would be entitled to one tenth of the 
value of the standard, or $5 per user. The intuition is that if A 
were the first technology to arrive and was therefore selected 
as the standard, it would then able to extract a royalty of $50 
from each user. If B arrived next, it would add nothing to the 
value of the standard, since A and B are purely alternatives, so 
it would receive zero, as would all the others except A. But if B 
happened to arrive first, it would receive $50, and A would re-
ceive nothing, as would all the others except B. The average 
over these scenarios is the Shapley value. We will refer to the 
approach proposed by Layne-Farrar et al. as “ex ante Shapley 
pricing” because each patent owner whose technology might 
have been included in the standard is entitled to a share, re-
gardless of whether its particular technology is actually cho-
sen.114 
While Layne-Farrar et al. present Swanson and Baumol’s 
auction models as efficiency-based, and Shapley pricing as 
“just,”115 this is not entirely fair to Shapley pricing, which is 
more efficient than auction pricing. It is true that Shapley val-
ue pricing is fair in an intuitive sense; for example, all the 
technologies in Scenario 1 are equally good, and with Shapley 
pricing, all patentees will get the same royalty. 
But Shapley pricing is also efficient. Under Shapley pricing 
the patentees do share in the value of standardization, as it is 
an explicit premise of the Shapley approach that the patentees 
are entitled to the same value that would be available to a sin-
gle patentee holding patents to all the relevant technologies.116 
 
IN HONOR OF LLOYD S. SHAPLEY 267 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1988) [hereinafter THE 
SHAPLEY VALUE] (providing further discussion); see also MARTIN J. OSBORNE 
& ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 291 (1994) (providing a sim-
ilar explanation). To date, however, Shapley pricing does not appear to have 
received any attention in the case law. 
 114. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 695–96 (noting that in their 
approach to Shapley pricing, patents that are not part of the ultimate stand-
ard will nonetheless receive non-zero value). 
 115. Id. at 693. 
 116. See id. at 694 (“The total value of the standard is distributed among 
all patents; nothing is left over.”); THE SHAPLEY VALUE, supra note 113, at 269 
(noting that a premise of Shapley value is that the output is “fully distribut-
ed”). The value of the standard is implicitly the amount that can actually be 
charged by the standard owner, not the social value. So while the premise, as 
described by Layne-Farrar et al., is that “[t]he total value of the standard is 
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But as we have seen, this in itself does not have any adverse 
implications for allocative efficiency. In terms of dynamic effi-
ciency, the Shapley approach is in principle superior to the auc-
tion model. Because the value shared by the patentees is the 
same as the value that could have been captured by a single 
patentee, the expected return to potential inventors under 
Shapley pricing is the same as that facing a single patentee 
charging what the market can bear. As we have seen, this may 
not be strictly optimal, but it is the appropriate benchmark. 
Shapley pricing can also be implemented to avoid ineffi-
ciencies due to sunk costs holdup by defining the value of the 
standard appropriately. It is established law that a reasonable 
royalty to a single patentee must be assumed to be negotiated 
ex ante, in order to avoid sunk costs holdup; by extension, the 
value that the patentees share under Shapley pricing is that 
value that could be extracted by a single patentee holding all 
the relevant patents but prior to the users incurring any sunk 
costs.117 If we define the value of the standard in this way, sunk 
costs holdup is avoided, and Shapley pricing is just as good as 
the auction model in terms of allocative efficiency.118 
Thus Shapley pricing is both fair and more efficient than 
auction pricing. Ex ante Shapley pricing as described by Layne-
Farrar et al. does have one major drawback, however, which 
means that in practice it will not be adequate from a dynamic 
perspective. It achieves fairness by awarding a royalty to all 
 
distributed among all patents,” this refers to the value of the standard that 
can be extracted in licensing, not the overall social value. Layne-Farrar et al., 
supra note 14, at 694. The authors also state that Shapley pricing approach 
“ignore[s] any market power that being included in a standard might bestow,” 
but they go on to explain that “[t]he Shapley value method of distributing 
rents bases payoffs on ex ante marginal contributions, so even IP that is not 
part of the ‘winning’ standard receives some payoff, as long as its average 
marginal contribution to some collections of patents is positive.” Id. at 701. 
Thus, they do not dispute that the patentees as a whole capture some part of 
the value of standardization, as does the particular patentee which is selected 
to be part of the standard, which is our point. Shapley pricing ignores the val-
ue of being included in the standard only in the sense that patentees which 
are not included in the standard will also share in the value of standardiza-
tion. 
 117. We consider this to be an uncontroversial clarification of Shapley pric-
ing. The Shapley model, even as explained by Layne-Farrar et al., is not ex-
plicit as to how the value of the standard is to be determined, as Shapley pric-
ing is primarily concerned with how to split that value. 
 118. Because Shapley pricing results in above marginal cost pricing, some 
users will be priced out of the market, but as discussed above, this is inherent 
in the patent system generally. 
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patentees whose technology might potentially have contributed 
to the standard, even if the technology was not actually select-
ed. As noted, in our example this means that all ten patentees 
would be entitled to a royalty, even though only one was actual-
ly selected. The difficulty with using ex ante Shapley pricing as 
the FRAND royalty is that as a matter of law only the patentee 
who is actually selected is entitled to a royalty, because none of 
the others will have their patent infringed. In Scenario 1, if A is 
selected, and is entitled to a royalty based on its ex ante Shap-
ley value, it will only get a royalty of $5, which means that the 
expected return to all patentees will be only one-tenth of what 
a single patentee would have received. In principle, the patent-
ees collectively should be entitled to receive the same amount 
as a single patentee. But in the real world, only a patentee 
whose patent is actually infringed will be entitled to a recovery, 
so in practice the actual aggregate return to the patentees 
would be substantially less than what would be available to a 
single patentee. This, in turn, implies that the expected return 
to an inventor contemplating an investment in a standardized 
technology would be correspondingly inadequate. 
III.  THE INCREMENTAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
PATENT TO THE VALUE OF THE STANDARD TO THE 
USER   
In this Part, we argue for our alternative approach to cal-
culating FRAND royalties, under which the royalty reflects the 
incremental contribution of the patent in suit to the value of 
the standard. As noted in the Introduction, this approach com-
bines two elements which we view as mutually reinforcing: 
first, a contingent ex ante framework which attempts to esti-
mate the bargain that reasonable parties would have struck 
prior to incurring sunk costs, but with full knowledge of all 
relevant information that is revealed ex post (including the 
patent’s inclusion in the chosen standard); and second, ex post 
Shapley pricing, which allocates the aggregate royalties pay-
able for the manufacture, sale, or use of standard-compliant 
products in proportion to each patent’s ex post marginal contri-
bution to the value of those products. Section A explains why 
the contingent ex ante approach is preferable to the Swanson 
and Baumol incremental ex ante approach, and Section B ex-
tends the framework to multiple SEPs. Section C then intro-
duces ex post Shapley pricing, and Section D discusses the 
practical implications of our proposal. 
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A. THE CONTINGENT EX ANTE APPROACH 
We propose that a better approach for setting FRAND roy-
alties is to posit a contingent ex ante hypothetical negotiation, 
coupled with what we will call “ex post” Shapley pricing.119 As 
in Swanson and Baumol’s auction model, this approach as-
sumes that royalties are set ex ante, that is, before users have 
incurred any sunk costs, and thus avoids the problem of sunk 
costs holdup. Our model differs from Swanson and Baumol’s, 
however, in that it is a negotiation model rather than an auc-
tion model. This means that the patentee and the user split the 
difference between the user’s maximum willingness to pay and 
the patentee’s minimum willingness to accept, in contrast to 
the auction model in which the patentee is bid down to its 
minimum. Moreover, the characteristic feature of the contin-
gent ex ante approach is that, while the hypothetical negotia-
tion takes place ex ante, the parties are assumed to have all ex 
post information; in particular, the parties are assumed to 
know which technology was selected as the standard.120 Put an-
other way, the hypothetical negotiation takes place ex ante, but 
it is contingent on ex post information. This feature ensures an 
adequate return to the patentees. The royalties are then appor-
tioned among the patentees according to Shapley pricing. How-
ever, rather than apportioning the royalties among all those 
patentees who might have been selected for the standard, as in 
the Shapley pricing model discussed by Layne-Farrar et al., our 
approach apportions the royalties only among patents that ac-
 
 119. The contingent ex ante model was originally proposed by Mario 
Mariniello. Mario Mariniello, Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory 
(FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Competition Authorities, 7 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 523, 526 (2011) (“[T]he licensing terms offered after the adoption of the 
standard (ex-post) should not be worse than those which the patent holder 
would have committed to ex-ante in the context of a standard setting contest 
conditional on the information that is available ex-post.”). We further devel-
oped it in a recent article. See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15. 
 120. More precisely, the fundamental principle is that the parties negotiate 
with ex post knowledge, which, in an infringement action, normally means 
that they will know whether the patents in question are essential. Note, how-
ever, that in Microsoft, whether the patents were in fact essential had not 
been established, because the action was not one for infringement, but rather 
for breach of contract premised on Motorola’s alleged failure to abide by its 
FRAND commitment. The court correctly held that, under these circumstanc-
es, a reasonable rate would be discounted to allow for the probability that the 
patents at issue were not in fact essential to the standard. See Microsoft v. 
Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *53 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 
2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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tually are selected for inclusion in the standard. For this rea-
son, we refer to it as ex post Shapley pricing, in contrast with 
the ex ante Shapley pricing described by Layne-Farrar et al. Ex 
post Shapley pricing implements the apportionment principle. 
The simplest way to understand our approach is to imagine 
a three-step process. In the first step, the SSO decides on the 
standard, including the patented technologies to be incorpo-
rated into the standard. In contrast to the incremental ex ante 
approach, users have no direct input at this stage (though the 
interests of the users will be taken into account by the SSO, 
which attempts to develop a standard that the users will find 
valuable). In the second stage, the SSO negotiates a royalty for 
the standard with the users before the users have invested any 
sunk costs in reliance on the standard. In the negotiation proc-
ess, the users do not have the option of adopting another stan-
dard incorporating different patented technology, but if a stan-
dard can be adopted with unpatented technology, that option 
can be taken into account. This means that the users cannot 
use the threat of switching to a standard based on patented 
technology B as bargaining leverage, though they can use the 
threat of switching to a non-standard technology B, or to a 
standard based on unpatented technology. In the third stage, 
after the royalty is negotiated, the SSO divides the royalty 
among the successful patentees by applying Shapley pricing to 
the technologies which were actually selected. (Note that this 
three-stage process does not strictly reflect our approach—some 
technical refinements are discussed in Appendix B—but it il-
lustrates its main points. Neither this model nor the more de-
tailed model set out in the Appendix are intended to describe 
how we think a real world royalty setting process should work. 
Rather, they are conceptual benchmarks for assessing a 
FRAND royalty, in the same spirit as Swanson & Baumol’s 
model.) 
Two points about the contingent ex ante approach deserve 
emphasis. First, because the negotiation takes place before the 
standard is adopted, the patentees whose technologies are 
adopted cannot capture any of the users’ sunk costs. This 
avoids any inefficiencies associated with sunk costs holdup. 
Second, the expected returns to inventors seeking to develop 
technology that will become part of the standard will be the 
same as the expected return to a single patentee seeking to de-
velop that technology in the absence of competition. In other 
words, it does not matter whether the standard develops 
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through a formal standard setting process or emerges as a de 
facto standard; the reasonable royalty will be the same in ei-
ther case. As explained in the context of Shapley pricing, we 
view this as the appropriate benchmark in terms of providing 
an incentive to invent. Conversely, from the perspective of the 
user, the contingent ex ante approach is neutral amongst the 
various possible reasons why the technology at issue is valu-
able to the user. 
Thus, to return to our motivating examples, the result of 
the contingent ex ante hypothetical negotiation in Scenario 1 
would be exactly the same as the result of an actual negotiation 
in Scenario 2B. In Scenario 2B, the users are willing to pay up 
to $100 to use technology A, because it is a standard (de facto). 
Under the contingent ex ante approach to Scenario 1, the users 
would likewise be willing to pay up to $100 to use technology A, 
because it is a standard (as a result of the formal selection 
process). In both Scenarios 1 and 2B, the patentee’s minimum 
willingness to accept is its marginal cost (which is zero in our 
examples) and each user’s next-best alternative is a non-
standard WLAN technology worth $10 (which each can license 
for $5).121 If the parties have the same bargaining power in both 
Scenarios, the royalty will be exactly the same in either case.122 
The exact share that will be captured by the patentee in a bar-
gaining model is indeterminate, but in our view that is not a 
flaw in our model.123 It is a reflection of the reality that there is 
no good descriptive model of the amount patentees actually re-
ceive in licensing negotiations. As discussed above, a full theo-
 
 121. In Scenario 1, that alternative would be one of the technologies that 
might have been, but was not, included in the standard, while in Scenario 2B 
it is one of the technologies that did not become a de facto standard because it 
emerged after A. 
 122. In Scenario 2, where there is only one WLAN technology, the users’ 
alternative is to use the pre-WLAN alternatives, such as telephones and wired 
internet, which are defined to be worth zero, and so on a standard Nash Bar-
gaining Solution the patentee’s royalty would be slightly higher than in Sce-
nario 1. Nonetheless, the principle is that the royalty does not depend on how 
the standard emerges; Scenario 1 is functionally different from Scenario 2 in 
terms of the alternatives available to the users, but functionally the same as 
Scenario 2B. We should emphasize that a Nash Bargaining Model is not a part 
of the contingent ex ante approach. Our basic point is that it is a bargaining 
model, as opposed to an auction model, which means that the patentee and the 
users will split the surplus. 
 123. For a contrary view, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas Knight, Problems in 
Sharing the Surplus, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95 (2013) (objecting to bar-
gaining models in the SEP context on the basis that the split in the surplus is 
arbitrary and an arbitrary royalty cannot be reasonable). 
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retical bargaining model would incorporate considerations of 
the optimal return to patentees from an incentive perspective. 
The case law, on the other hand, attempts to answer this ques-
tion from an empirical perspective, by looking for the returns 
on comparable licenses. For our purposes, it is enough to say 
that a bargaining model, not an auction model, is appropriate 
in the SEP context, just as it is appropriate in the context of 
reasonable royalty damages generally. 
Before turning to the question of apportioning the royalty 
among the many patented technologies making up the stan-
dard, we will consider some objections to our model that can be 
assessed in the context of the simple single technology stan-
dard. The most important of these is that, while the patentee 
whose technology is adopted cannot capture any of the users’ 
sunk costs, it is able to capture some substantial part of the 
value of standardization. This seems contrary to the principle 
that the patentee is entitled to capture the value of its technol-
ogy, but not the value of standardization. We have two re-
sponses to this objection, or more precisely two different ways 
of framing the same response. 
One response is to say that, if the principle that the pat-
entee is not entitled to capture any of the value of standardiza-
tion is understood as meaning that the royalty available to the 
patentee should be capped by its incremental ex ante value as 
in the auction model, then that principle is simply wrong. As 
discussed in our critique of the auction model in Part II,124 the 
incremental ex ante model does not provide an adequate incen-
tive to invent, whereas the contingent ex ante approach pro-
vides an appropriate incentive to invent without any allocative 
inefficiency (apart from the possibility of some users being 
priced out of the market, which is an implication of the patent 
system generally). 
But we need not reject the principle that the patentee is 
entitled to capture only the value of the technology, so long as 
that value is properly defined. The cases establishing this prin-
ciple do not provide a precise definition of “the value of the 
technology,” perhaps on the assumption that the term is self-
evident. But as discussed above, even in the very simple exam-
ple illustrated by Scenario 1 it is not at all intuitive what con-
stitutes the value of the technology; is it the $500 that patentee 
A was in fact receiving annually prior to standardization, or the 
 
 124. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
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consumer surplus of its customers ($1000 in our example), or 
the full value of the market to all patentees prior to standardi-
zation ($5000), or even the full social prior to standardization 
($10,000)? Or it is zero, as Swanson and Baumol’s auction 
model would have it? Certainly it seems strongly counter-
intuitive to say that the value of the technology was zero, given 
that the patent was actually licensed for $500 before standardi-
zation, and the value of the market dependent on the technol-
ogy is $100,000. 
In our view, “the value of the technology” is simply the 
value of the technology to users; or more precisely, the value of 
the functionality provided by the patented technology, as com-
pared with the next best unpatented alternative, excluding any 
amount that can be extracted because of sunk costs expended 
by the user in reliance on that technology.125 It is the technology 
itself that is being valued, not the patent.126 This is why the 
contingent ex ante approach gives the same result in Scenarios 
1 and 2. The value of WLAN to the user is the same whether 
the technology emerges from a formal standard setting process 
or a de facto process; the value of WLAN to the users is the 
same whether there is only one technology capable of providing 
that functionality, or many technologies. 
Further, our analysis suggests that there is no such thing 
as “the value of standardization” distinct from the value of the 
technology. Consider, for example, a communications technol-
ogy that is valueless unless at least two people are using it. 
Should we say that the value of the first telephone was zero be-
cause it was useless until there were two? But when there were 
two telephones, was the value of those telephones attributable 
to the telephone technology or to the fact that they were 
shared? To be sure, the value of a communications technology 
does rise more than proportionately as the number of users in-
creases (which is what gives rise to network effects). But it is 
conceptually impossible to separate the contribution of the 
technology and the contribution of the network effects, unless 
we say that the value of the technology is the value when there 
 
 125. Put another way, the key meaning of the “value of the technology” is 
that the patentee should not be able to capture any part of the users’ sunk 
cost. As we have noted, standardization is often accompanied by sunk costs, 
and in our view the principle that the patentee cannot capture any of the val-
ue of standardization is sound to the extent that it means that the patentee 
cannot capture any of the users’ sunk costs. 
 126. See Taylor, supra note 16. 
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are no network effects at all—which is to say, zero. Other than 
that, we cannot say that the natural value of the technology is 
the value of the network when there are two users, or 100 or 
1,000,000; the numbers are arbitrary. Moreover, while it may 
seem natural to say that the value of standardization is the 
value that arises after the standard is adopted, this under-
standing is arbitrary too, because it suggests that the value of 
the technology is different depending on whether the standard 
happened to be adopted when there were 100 users or 
1,000,000. But the particular time of standardization is hap-
penstance. If a patentee cannot capture any more value than 
inhered in the technology prior to adoption of the standard, 
then all patentees would want to delay the standardization 
process in order to maximize the returns to patentees.127 This is 
clearly undesirable. 
More generally, our analysis treats all sources of value 
neutrally. Whether the value of the technology is due to net-
work effects, to effects which scale linearly (such as per-unit 
production cost savings), or to idiosyncratic factors does not af-
fect the royalty the user should pay. This principle of value 
neutrality is sound. To illustrate, suppose a patented invention 
which causes LEDs implanted in running shoes to flash syn-
chronously with dance music is worth $100 million to users be-
cause it becomes a fashion craze after being featured in a music 
video. It is uncontroversial that the patentee in that case is en-
titled to capture a share of the full $100 million. Now suppose 
that another invention enables a substantial increase in WLAN 
network speeds and is also worth $100 million to users after it 
is adopted as a standard. Suppose further that the value aris-
ing on standardization due to network effects, however that 
might be defined, is $90 million. If the patentee in the second 
example is entitled only to a share of the $10 million, on the 
view that it is not entitled to capture any value of standardiza-
tion, there will be a substantially greater incentive to invent 
technologies like flashing shoes rather than enhanced WLAN, 
even though the social value is the same in either case. In our 
view, the patent system should not discriminate between in-
ventions depending on the source of their value to users, but if 
 
 127. If the patentees cannot capture any of the value arising ex post, collec-
tively they would prefer to have the standard arise de facto. No individual pa-
tentee would be sure that its technology would prevail, but the aggregate re-
turn would be higher if the standard developed later and thus the expected 
value to any patentee would be increased by delay. 
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there is an argument to be made for discrimination on that ba-
sis, surely network effects are not a source of value that should 
be particularly disfavored. 
In our approach, by contrast, the value of the technology is 
simply equal to its value to the users, whether the technology 
happens to be one in which the value grows more or less line-
arly with the number of users, as with pharmaceuticals, or dis-
proportionately with the number of users, as with communica-
tions technology. (Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between 
technologies which show network effects and those which do 
not, as many, perhaps most technologies display network ef-
fects to some degree.)128 And while the users cannot play off one 
patented technology against another, they can threaten to go to 
an unpatented standard as leverage in the bargaining process. 
This means that the value of the technology is capped by the 
difference in the value to the user and the value of the best un-
patented alternative. For example, suppose that as in Scenario 
1, the market is mature but fragmented. There are nine firms 
that have developed and patented WLAN technology, A, B, . . . 
I, but the tenth technology J, is unpatented. These technologies 
are all equally good. Even if the SSO selected technology A as 
the standard, in the ex ante negotiation the users would be able 
to threaten to adopt the unpatented technology J, which means 
that A will get a royalty of zero. This is intuitively sound, given 
that A is no better than the unpatented alternative. More gen-
erally, the value of the technology that is adopted as the stan-
dard is no more than the value as compared with the best un-
patented alternative standard. 
Consequently, under our approach a FRAND royalty is 
treated in exactly the same manner as any other reasonable roy-
alty.129 Our concept of the value of the technology in the FRAND 
context is exactly the same as the standard definition of the 
value of the technology outside the FRAND context, which is to 
say it is the difference between the value to the user of the 
technology and the next best unpatented alternative.130 Our ap-
 
 128. For example, a particular car model becomes more valuable as more 
people own it, because parts are more easily available; a drug will become 
more valuable as more people take it because prescribing physicians will be-
come more familiar with its effects; and so on. 
 129. See note 119 and accompanying text. In this respect we agree with 
Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 55. 
 130. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 
1341, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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proach therefore can be directly applied to any reasonable roy-
alty scenario, and it simply reduces to a simpler model as the 
circumstances require. 
A second possible objection to our contingent ex ante bar-
gaining model is that it is unfair, inasmuch as all of the ten 
patentees had exactly equivalent technologies, and A’s selection 
was more or less arbitrary. In our model, A is the only patentee 
to share in the surplus; the others get no return on their inven-
tions, which were just as valuable as A’s except for the happen-
stance of not being chosen. This point seems to underpin the in-
tuition that a patentee should only be entitled to the value of 
its invention and not the value of standardization.131 
We concede that, by awarding the entire value of stan-
dardization to A, even though A was selected arbitrarily, the 
contingent ex ante approach might seem to abandon the fair-
ness that is an attractive feature of ex ante Shapley pricing. 
The difference between ex ante Shapley pricing and the contin-
gent ex ante approach in this respect is that under the contin-
gent ex ante approach the entire expected return will be real-
ized by the patentee whose technology is selected, whereas 
under ex ante Shapley pricing it would be split between the 
successful patentee and unsuccessful patentees who will never 
be able to bring a claim. Even so, the contingent ex ante ap-
proach is fair to patentees on average (if not in individual 
cases), and it is certainly more fair to patentees than Swanson 
and Baumol’s auction model. And our approach is no more un-
fair than the patent system generally. In our Scenario 2, for ex-
ample, technology A captured the entire market because it was 
developed first. If B through J were developing their inventions 
at the same time, and just happened to be slightly later to 
market, the incremental value of A’s contribution is only the 
slightly earlier date of development, and not the entire value of 
the WLAN market. Yet A will uncontroversially be able to cap-
ture the entire value of the market,132 simply by virtue of hav-
 
 131. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 685 (“Common sense 
suggests that it cannot be ‘fair,’ ‘reasonable,’ or ‘non-discriminatory’ to offer 
the holder of easily substitutable patents the same compensation as the holder 
of a critical, irreplaceable patented technology supporting the same stand-
ard.”). For other objections, see George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust 
Law To Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 913, 919–20 (2011) (arguing, among other things, that ex post events are 
unanticipated and therefore not relevant to incentives). We address this issue 
in Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15, at 29–30. 
 132. By this we mean the $50,000, not the full social value of $100,000. 
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ing been first. When a de facto standard emerges because of the 
first-to-market advantage, the advantage gained by being in-
crementally first is almost as unfair as the advantage gained by 
being selected by an SSO, yet this is not thought to be an objec-
tion to the ordinary operation of the patent system. 
Two further issues deserve comment. First, under our ap-
proach it is possible that the return to any individual patentee 
may be less than the cost of the invention, even if the value of 
the WLAN technology is greater than the aggregate cost of in-
vention, simply because a patentee whose invention is not in-
corporated into the standard may not receive any royalty at all. 
But we do not view this as an objection to our approach; rather, 
it is simply a reflection of the patent race problem that may 
arise in any area of patent law.133 In many fields, such as 
pharmaceuticals, roughly similar solutions to the same problem 
may be patented at approximately the same time, and conse-
quently they will share a market that otherwise might have 
gone to just one of them. The problem is exactly the same 
whether there are network effects, so that one of the alterna-
tives takes a large share of the market and the others get none, 
or when there are no network effects, so that all the alterna-
tives take a smaller share of the overall market. In either case, 
the expected return to the patentees is less than it would be in 
the absence of simultaneous invention, and in either case the 
simultaneous invention arises for the same reason, namely that 
many different inventors perceive the same need and provide 
an innovative solution. While this may well be a problem for 
innovation, it is not one which a theory of SEP royalties needs 
to address. In any event, our contingent ex ante approach, un-
der which the patentee gets some part of the value of stan-
dardization, is surely better from this perspective than the auc-
tion approach, in which even the winning patentee gets 
nothing. 
Second, unlike the auction model, the contingent ex ante 
approach does not provide any precise number for the reason-
 
 133. In principle, a patent race could dissipate the entire patentee surplus, 
though in reality the effects of patent races may be more complex. See Mark A. 
Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 749–60 (2012) 
(discussing the literature and arguing that patent races “may have gotten a 
bad rap”). More generally, the contingent ex ante model does not guarantee 
the patentee a sufficient return to cover its costs of invention. We do not view 
this as a shortcoming of the approach; this is a characteristic of reasonable 
royalty damages generally and it is this fact which makes the patent incentive 
high-powered. 
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able royalty, even in theory. The hypothetical negotiation splits 
the surplus between the parties and thus leaves the outcome of 
the negotiation to the theoretical black box of bargaining power 
(or, in practice, to any evidence of bargaining power and com-
parable licenses in the particular field). Again, though, we do 
not view this as a shortcoming of the model. There is no good 
general model of the optimal return to a patentee, and our 
model, like the hypothetical negotiation in reasonable royalties 
generally, is agnostic on that point. This agnosticism is prefer-
able to the auction model, which does provide a clear outcome, 
but one which is clearly inefficient from a dynamic perspective. 
And because the contingent ex ante model is applicable to rea-
sonable royalties generally, if a general model of optimal royal-
ties ever were to become accepted, under our model it would be 
directly applicable in the SEP context as well. 
B. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE SEPS 
Two additional issues arise when a standard requires mul-
tiple patents for its implementation. One is the well-known 
problem of royalty stacking, which requires that the overall 
royalty for the standard not be excessive.134 The second is how 
to allocate royalties among the essential patents, a matter we 
referred to above as the apportionment problem.135 Apropos of 
this second issue, the emerging FRAND case law recognizes 
that “a patent that is extremely important and central to the 
standard would reasonably command a higher royalty rate 
than a less important patent.”136 In this Section, we show that 
the contingent ex ante approach addresses the problem of roy-
alty stacking, and when supplemented with ex post Shapley 
pricing, it also resolves the apportionment problem. In contrast, 
the incremental ex ante approach, as it turns out, is inconsis-
tent with the proportionality principle. 
Extending the contingent ex ante approach to multiple 
patents is straightforward. In our three-step approach, by way 
of illustration, the user is assumed to bargain with the SSO for 
the right to use the standard. But since the user values the 
standard as a whole rather than the individual patents, this 
step is the same whether the standard requires one patent or 
 
 134. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 7, 20 and accompanying text. 
 136. Microsoft v. Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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many. In other words, whether the functionality is imple-
mented by one patent or many is irrelevant to the value of that 
technology to the user, and it is therefore irrelevant to the roy-
alty that will be paid by the user in the negotiations with the 
SSO. This in itself eliminates the problem of royalty stacking, 
both in terms of Cournot complements137 and in the more gen-
eral sense of excessive royalties arising from multiple licenses. 
Under the contingent ex ante approach, the patentees jointly 
will receive, and the user will pay, exactly the same amount as 
if the standard was implemented by a single technology held by 
a single patentee. 
More generally, the royalty that a single patentee who had 
developed all the relevant technology would receive as the re-
sult of a contingent ex ante negotiation is the appropriate 
benchmark for a FRAND royalty for a standard involving mul-
tiple patentees. The value of the functionality to the user is the 
same whether that functionality is implemented by one pat-
ented technology or by multiple patented technologies. The to-
tal return to the patentees should also be the same either way: 
otherwise, patentees would have an incentive to implement the 
standard in a way that requires multiple technologies rather 
than one, in order to claim a larger share of the value of the 
functionality. Consequently, we take it as a fundamental prin-
ciple that the overall royalty should not depend on the number 
of patents. 
The equivalency with a negotiation with a single patentee 
also satisfies both the principle that the royalty should provide 
an adequate incentive to invent (i.e., that the royalty should be 
commensurate with the value of the invention) and that it 
should balance widespread adoption of the standard against a 
reasonable return to the patentees.138 Under the contingent ex 
ante approach, the total royalties payable for use of any stan-
dard are proportionate to the standard’s social value. Moreover, 
the total royalty paid by the user will be the same whether the 
standard is a de facto standard with a single patent being held 
by a single patentee, multiple patents held by a single pat-
entee, or a standard set by an SSO with multiple patentees. 
The reward to the patentees as a group—whether that group 
consists of one or many individuals—depends only on the value 
of the standard to the user. This ensures that the reward for 
 
 137. See supra note 5. 
 138. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
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developing the technology used to implement the standard is 
the same regardless of how exactly it is developed. This also 
contrasts with the incremental ex ante approach, under which 
the royalty depends not only on the value of the technology to 
the user, but also on the state of ex ante competition. Thus, if 
competition were fierce in respect of a crucial aspect of a stan-
dard, and tame in respect of an aspect of that standard which 
added little value, under the incremental ex ante approach the 
total royalty for the latter could easily be more than for the 
former, in violation of the proportionality principle. 
The royalty received by the single patentee under the con-
tingent ex ante approach also balances the need for widespread 
adoption of the standard against a reasonable return to the 
patentee. In bargaining, a single patentee will take into ac-
count the fact that a lower royalty will result in more wide-
spread adoption of the patent, and thus a larger overall surplus 
available to be split, while trading this off against the fact that 
the widest adoption would require a zero return to the patentee 
(unless perfect price discrimination is possible).139 The contin-
gent ex ante bargain therefore will result in a royalty which en-
courages the widest adoption of the standard consistent with a 
reasonable return to the patentee; and for this reason, the roy-
alty stacking problem disappears. The Cournot complements 
problem arises when multiple patentees (or input providers 
more generally) do not take into account the externality in the 
form of reduced sales which their royalty imposes on other in-
put providers.140 The assumption that the user negotiates with 
the SSO for a single royalty, as it would with a single patentee 
holding all the relevant patents (whether that is one or many), 
solves this problem. 
C. EX POST SHAPLEY PRICING 
The next issue to consider is how to divide the royalty 
among the patentees. Although the contingent ex ante model is 
consistent with a variety of approaches, ideally the division of 
 
 139. In general, a monopolist will maximize profits by trading off higher 
prices for lower quantities sold, until marginal cost equates marginal revenue. 
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 332–33 (9th ed. 
2014). 
 140. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, 
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECON-
OMY 119–50 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (providing a general version of 
Cournot’s theory of complements cast in terms of blocking patents). 
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royalties should respect the proportionality principle—the idea 
that a patent more important to the standard receives a higher 
royalty than one that is less important—because this principle 
better serves the goal of dynamic efficiency. In this Section, we 
will argue that the contingent ex ante approach, combined with 
what we will call ex post Shapley pricing, respects the propor-
tionality principle in a way that is both intuitively and theo-
retically appealing. 
As discussed above, under Shapley pricing as applied to 
the standard setting context by Layne-Farrar et al., “the patent 
owners arrive at the SSO” in random order, and the Shapley 
value of a particular patent is its average marginal contribu-
tion over all possible arrival sequences.141 We referred to this as 
ex ante Shapley pricing, as the Shapley value is determined be-
fore the patents are actually selected to be included in the 
standard: every patentee whose technology might have been se-
lected is entitled to a royalty. In ex post Shapley pricing, by 
contrast, rather than considering the contribution of all patent-
ees whose technology might have been selected to implement 
the standard, we apply Shapley pricing to all patentees whose 
technology actually was selected to implement the standard. In 
the simple example discussed earlier, the problem is captured 
by assuming that a standard consists of two complementary 
functionalities, A and B. The components are strict comple-
ments, which is to say that the standard is worthless unless 
both components are present.142 In Case 1, assume that there is 
perfect competition ex ante for both components. That is, there 
are multiple patented technologies A1, A2, etc., which could 
provide functionality A, and multiple patented technologies B1, 
B2, etc., which could provide functionality B. Two of these, A1 
and B1, are selected by the SSO to be part of the standard. 
Each user is willing to pay $200 for the operational standard, 
and with equal bargaining power each pays $100. If A1 arrives 
first, the standard is not operational and no user will be willing 
to pay anything. If B1 then arrives, a functional standard can 
be implemented and the value to be split between the patentees 
is $100. A1’s marginal contribution is zero, and B1’s marginal 
contribution is $100. But if B1 arrives first, the results will be 
exactly the opposite. Therefore, the two patentees will share 
 
 141. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 689. 
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the available royalties equally, which is to say $50.143 This 
seems intuitively reasonable, given that the standard is not op-
erational without both. 
Now consider a standard in which the patents are not 
strictly complementary. Not all patents which are “essential” to 
a standard are necessarily strictly complementary, in the sense 
that a valuable standard could not be implemented at all with-
out them. Most obviously, patents which are necessary to im-
plement an optional part of a standard are nonetheless consid-
ered essential, at least under the IEEE-SA Bylaws.144 More 
importantly, even patents that are required to implement a 
mandatory part of the standard are not necessarily strictly 
complementary.145 For example, in a WLAN standard a particu-
lar technology might be required to implement a high-
throughput protocol which is mandatory for an advanced stan-
dard. Even if the particular standard itself cannot be imple-
mented without that technology, and even assuming that there 
are no alternatives to the patented high-throughput technology, 
an operable and commercially useful standard can be imple-
mented without the higher throughput capability, though the 
standard with the high-throughput technology is more valuable 
than one without it. The question is how to allocate the value of 
the standard as a whole between the various technologies. For 
example, consider a stylized WLAN standard in which technol-
ogy A is required for the basic transmission function, while 
technology B provides advanced security. A WLAN standard 
could be implemented using technology A alone, but B is use-
 
 143. Compare with the incremental ex ante approach, in which each pa-
tentee would receive $0 in this scenario; and ex ante Shapley pricing, in which 
each patentee would receive $50/N, where N is the number of functionally 
equivalent patented technologies which might have been incorporated in the 
standard. 
 144. See IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & 
ELECS. ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/ 
sb_bylaws.pdf. 
 145. Patents that are all essential to a mandatory part of a standard are 
complementary in the sense that a compliant implementation of the standard 
is impossible without using (or infringing) the patented technology. We will 
refer to this as “legal” complementarity, in contrast to the “technical” comple-
mentarity which arises when there are superadditive effects from using two 
technologies in tandem. Our discussion in the text refers solely to technical 
complementarity, on the view that the reasonable royalty should reflect the 
value of the standard to the user, and the value to the user lies in the tech-
nical functionality of the standard. See Taylor, supra note 16 (emphasizing 
that the royalty should reflect the technology). 
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less without A. Each user would be willing to pay $100 for a 
standard implemented with technology A alone, and $120 for 
the standard with the additional security provided by technol-
ogy B. By the same methodology, the royalties would be $110 to 
A1 and $10 to B1.146 The intuition is that A1 is entitled to more 
than $100 because it supplies all of the value derived from the 
transmission function alone ($100), and some of the value de-
rived from the security function, which is worthless without the 
transmission function. 
In principle ex post Shapley pricing can easily be extended 
to any combination of patents. For example, if two strictly com-
plementary technologies, A and B, are required to implement 
the transmission function, and one technology C, is required for 
the security functionality, the royalties would be A1 = $56.67; 
B1 = $56.67; C1 = $6.67. If two complementary technologies, C 
and D, are required to implement the security functionality, the 
royalties would be: A1 = $55; B1 = $55; C1 = $5; D1 $5. If one 
technology, A, is required to implement the transmission func-
tion, and three complementary technologies, B, C, and D are 
required for the security functionality, the royalties would be 
A1 = $105; B1 = $5; C1 = $5; D1 = $5. If three complementary 
technologies, A, B, and C are required to implement the trans-
mission function, and one technology, D is required for the se-
curity functionality, the royalties would be A1 = $38.33; B1 = 
$38.33; C1 = $38.33; D1 = $5. 
Ex post Shapley pricing therefore satisfies the proportion-
ality principle in an intuitively reasonable way. No doubt there 
are other possible mechanisms for dividing the total value re-
ceived by the patentee which would also satisfy the proportion-
ality principle, though Shapley pricing also has a number of 
characteristics which make it particularly attractive.147 These 
examples at least show that a principled method of dividing the 
royalties which satisfies the proportionality principle is theo-
retically possible. 
Ex post Shapley pricing contrasts with several other possi-
ble methods for dividing the royalties that clearly do not satisfy 
proportionality. Some patent pools, for example, simply allocate 
royalties to each patentee according to the number of patents it 
 
 146. Arrival order (A1, B1) = $100 A1, $20 B1; (B1, A1) = $0 B1, $120 A1: 
average is A1 = $110, B1 = $10. 
 147. See infra Appendix A. 
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holds.148 This method, which we refer to as numeric proportion-
ality, has the practical advantage of simplicity (and may well 
be justified for that reason in some circumstances), but it 
clearly does not satisfy proportionality in the sense we are us-
ing that term. 
Nor does incremental ex ante pricing satisfy the propor-
tionality principle, because the royalty received under the lat-
ter is determined by whether there are alternatives ex ante, not 
by the importance of the technology. Thus, as we have seen, a 
key technology with several alternatives may get a zero return, 
while a secondary technology with few alternatives may receive 
a high return. To illustrate, in our WLAN example if only one 
technology is needed to implement the transmission functional-
ity and one to implement the security functionality, under 
Shapley pricing the technology actually used for transmission 
(A1) would receive a royalty of $110, while the technology used 
for security (B1) would receive $10, regardless of how many 
technologies were competing ex ante. By contrast, under the in-
cremental ex ante approach, the royalties will depend on the 
number of technologies available ex ante. If there are three 
equally good alternative technologies (A1, A2, and A3) available 
ex ante which could be used to implement the transmission 
functionality, but only one (B1) available to implement the se-
curity functionality, the royalty payable to A1 will be $0, and to 
B1 $120. This result clearly would not be consistent with the 
proportionality requirement149—and in general, neither would 
ex ante Shapley pricing, because the royalty for an important 
technology will be diluted if there were many equivalents ex 
ante. 
Finally, we note that the most straightforward implemen-
tation of the contingent ex ante method will also apportion the 
royalties according to the value of the technology to each user, 
 
 148. See, e.g., John M. Browning & Carla S. Mulhern, Licensing in the 
Presence of Technology Standards, LICENSING J., Aug. 2009, at 18, 26–27. 
Sidak asserts that applying Shapley pricing to SEPs would necessarily result 
in numeric proportionality because all SEPs are by definition essential. See 
Sidak, supra note 14, at 1043–44. But, this misses the point that a valuable 
standard could be created without every patent that is essential to the chosen 
standard. Users sometimes have little if any use for some SEPs, as was true 
for the video interlacing feature of H.264. 
 149. An analogous proposal was specifically rejected by Judge Robart in 
Microsoft as being an attempt by Motorola to extract the value of the stan-
dard. See Microsoft v. Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *44 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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not just its value to the standard. This is consistent with the 
case law.150 We have generally left open the question of whether 
the SSO is assumed to bargain with each user individually or 
with users as a group. The easiest and correct approach, which 
is also consistent with the case law,151 is to imagine that each 
individual user bargains with the SSO for the right to use the 
standard, contingent on the standard having been adopted and 
in the knowledge that other users will therefore also adopt the 
standard. A user who values the standard more will be willing 
to pay more for it. Further, a user who values particular as-
pects of the standard more or less will pay more or less for 
those aspects. For example, suppose there are two users, X and 
Y. Both value the basic transmission capability of a standard-
ized WLAN at $100, but X would be willing to pay $140 for a 
standard that also includes the security feature, while the se-
curity feature is worthless to Y, who would only pay $100 for 
the right to use the standard, whether or not it has the security 
functionality. Even though both are licensing the entire stan-
dard, under the contingent ex ante approach, X would have to 
pay $140 in royalties for the standard and Y would have to pay 
only $100 for the same standard. Further, if we add ex post 
Shapley pricing, the return to each patentee will reflect the im-
portance of the patent both to the particular user and to the 
technology as a whole. If B brought an action against X, a rea-
sonable royalty using the contingent ex ante method with ex 
post Shapley pricing would be $20, but if B brought an action 
against Y, the reasonable royalty would be zero.152 
This approach also automatically satisfies the apportion-
ment principle that the royalty should reflect the value of the 
technology to the standard, since the value to the standard is 
simply the aggregate of the value to the individual users.153 In 
contrast, the incremental ex ante approach is generally not 
consistent with the apportionment principle. It would be possi-
ble to apply that approach on a user by user basis, but the 
 
 150. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20, *42. 
 151. See, e.g., Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *20 (holding that the royalty 
must reflect the value of the technology to the particular user); id. at *47–49 
(noting that the technology at issue was of minimal importance to Microsoft’s 
products). 
 152. The FRAND royalty payable by X to A would be $120 and by Y to A 
would be $100. 
 153. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *6. 
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value of each patent embodied in the standard is determined by 
the state of ex ante competition, not on the value of the stan-
dard to a particular user. Suppose, for example, that there was 
perfect competition ex ante in the market for component A, and 
none for component B. If B brought an action against X, a rea-
sonable royalty using the incremental ex ante approach would 
be $140. If B brought an action against Y the reasonable roy-
alty would be zero, because even though there is no competition 
for that component, its incremental ex ante value is nonethe-
less zero so far as Y is concerned.154 Conversely, suppose there 
was perfect competition ex ante in the market for component B 
and none for component A. If B brought an action against ei-
ther X or Y, a reasonable royalty using the incremental ex ante 
approach would be $0.155 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
In the Introduction, we conceded that our proposed theo-
retical framework—under which a FRAND royalty reflects an 
SEP’s incremental contribution to the value of the standard—
probably cannot be directly implemented in practice (though 
the same is true of other idealized approaches, including the in-
cremental ex ante approach). Although one might imagine, as 
we stated above, a three-step process in which an SSO negoti-
ates an aggregate royalty with users in advance of the users 
having incurred any sunk costs,156 in reality SSOs do not do this 
(nor do we suggest that they should). Any testimony about how 
such negotiations, had they actually occurred, would have tran-
spired necessarily would involve a great deal of speculation. It 
is likewise difficult for us to imagine much good resulting from 
having experts “educate” juries in the intricacies of concepts 
like Shapley pricing. Given the costs and uncertainties of pat-
ent litigation as things stand, one might ask, what good is a 
theoretical model that either cannot be used at all, or only at 
enormous expense in terms of money and predictability? 
The answer to this question is twofold. First, having an 
appropriate conceptual benchmark is useful in determining 
which of the seven principles set out in the Introduction should 
 
 154. The FRAND royalty payable by X or Y to A would be $0. 
 155. The FRAND royalty payable by X to A would be $140 and by Y to A 
would be $100. 
 156. Or, as described infra Appendix A, more accurately as a cooperative 
game with transferable utility. 
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be retained and which, if any, should be modified or discarded. 
Relatedly, the benchmark also helps to determine how best to 
interpret the principles that remain. Second, the benchmark 
can be useful in determining what sorts of practical evidence 
and methodological approaches should be admissible—namely, 
those that are likely to be consistent with the conceptual 
benchmark, as opposed to those that are not. We elaborate be-
low. 
1. Principles To Retain, Modify, or Discard 
First, as discussed above (and in greater detail in Appendix 
A), Shapley pricing is the natural interpretation of the incre-
mental contribution of one technology when the value of the 
standard is greater than the sum of its parts. Shapley pricing 
in our model implements the incremental value principle, and 
is therefore consistent with Judge Robart’s statement that a 
“central” principle of (F)RAND royalties is that “the parties in a 
hypothetical negotiation would set RAND royalty rates by look-
ing at the importance of the SEPs to the standard and the im-
portance of the standard and the SEPs to the products at is-
sue.”157 Our model therefore provides a central role for Principle 
(4), the proportionality principle. 
Shapley pricing also provides a natural interpretation of 
Principle (3), the incremental ex ante principle, as meaning 
that the royalty any patentee can receive is capped by the ex 
ante incremental value of the patented technology as compared 
with the best unpatented alternative.158 This contrasts with the 
implementation of the incremental ex ante principle in Swan-
son & Baumol’s auction model. Our analysis in Parts II and III 
above shows that if the incremental ex ante principle is under-
stood as meaning the incremental value of the selected technol-
ogy over the best alternative patented technology, it is inconsis-
 
 157. Microsoft v. Motorola, No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *3 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). Judge 
Holderman has similarly stated that the royalty to a particular patentee must 
reflect the value that patent contributes to the functionality. See Innovatio, 
2013 WL 5593609, at *10 (“Imagine, for example, that the court has deter-
mined that a given patent portfolio provides 25% of the functionality of a 
standard, and that the court is considering a proposed RAND rate based on 
that determination. Logically, the other standard-essential patents outside of 
the portfolio should comprise 75% of the value of the standard, or three times 
the value of the asserted portfolio.”). 
 158. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed description of how this 
emerges from our model. 
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tent with both the incentive-to-invent and proportionality prin-
ciples, because the patentee’s reward depends more upon the 
state of ex ante competition than upon the value that imple-
menters derive from the use of the invention. The result may be 
a reward that either overcompensates or undercompensates the 
inventor in relation to the invention’s contribution to the stan-
dard—and to the extent the result is likely to be undercompen-
sation, the incremental ex ante approach also undermines 
Principle (6), the incentive to participate in SSO activities. 
Given the centrality of the incentive-to-invent and proportion-
ality principles to a system of patent incentives,159 this analysis 
leads us to conclude that courts should discard the incremental 
ex ante approach, at least in its “pure” Swanson & Baumol 
form. 
Our guiding principle is that the patentee is entitled to its 
incremental contribution to the value of the standard, which ex-
cludes any part of the implementers’ sunk costs. Thus, under 
our analysis, statements to the effect that royalties should re-
flect the value of the technology, not the value of the standard 
(Principle (5)), should be interpreted to mean only that a patent 
making a relatively small contribution to the value of a stan-
dard should not command a royalty that reflects the value of 
the other, more important patents, nor should it reflect the im-
plementers’ sunk costs. To permit the royalty to reflect the 
value of the standard in this sense would violate the propor-
tionality principle, among other things. At the same time, how-
ever, dynamic efficiency considerations counsel in favor of per-
mitting the royalty to reflect a share of the value of 
standardization, understood as the additional value arising 
from widespread adoption of the technology on standardization, 
which is proportionate to the technology’s contribution to that 
value. There is no reason to treat value arising from wide-
spread use due to standardization differently from value aris-
ing from widespread use due to a product that is successful for 
other reasons. 
Significantly, both the IEEE-SA Bylaws (which defines a 
“Reasonable Rate” as “appropriate compensation to the patent 
holder for the practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding 
the value, if any, resulting from the inclusion of that Essential 
 
 159. Though, as noted above, cost considerations sometimes might trump 
application of proportionality in favor of something simpler, such as numeric 
proportionality. See supra text accompanying note 147. Nevertheless, we think 
that proportionality should be the default principle. 
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Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard”160) and the 
Microsoft decision can be read in this fashion. As for the latter, 
Judge Robart noted that, although there was “clear value to 
implementers . . . to offer products compliant with the H.264 
Standard, this value reflects the value of standard compliance 
and interoperability, not the value of any individual patents.”161 
Consequently, testimony that related only to the general im-
portance of the H.264 standard to Microsoft’s products “reflects 
an improper attempt by Motorola to capture the value of the 
H.264 Standard itself as opposed to a royalty on the actual eco-
nomic value of Motorola’s patented technology.”162 Similarly, 
the no holdup principle (Principle (1)), should be understood as 
standing for the proposition that the patentee cannot capture 
any part of the user’s sunk costs or the value of other technolo-
gies, but it is unobjectionable for the patentee to appropriate 
some part of the increased value derived from network effects 
on standardization. 
Once we decide that the patentee is entitled to its incre-
mental contribution to the overall value of the standard, the in-
centive to invent and the incentive to participate (Principles (6) 
and (7)) are automatically satisfied. Because the value distrib-
uted to the patentee is proportionate to the value to the user—
unlike the auction model—the incentive to invent is propor-
tionate to the social value, as in the patent system generally. 
To depart from Shapley pricing by increasing the reward to one 
patentee, with a corresponding reduction to another patentee, 
would provide an excessive incentive to invent to the first and 
an inadequate incentive to invent to the second. If this reward 
does not cover the costs of invention, this is simply because, 
with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the invention was 
 
 160. IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. 
ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws 
.pdf. In particular, we would argue that “the value of the patented feature,” 
the “value of [the] patented technology,” and “appropriate compensation to the 
patent holder” should be understood as including a portion of the increased 
value due to network effects, but not any value beyond the patent’s marginal 
contribution to the standard. This “value beyond” would include sunk costs, 
differential opportunity costs, and the marginal contribution of other patents. 
See supra note 42. 
 161. Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *42. Judge Robart further stated that 
“negotiating parties would consider only the economic value of the patented 
technology—based on the technology’s contribution to the standard and to the 
implementer’s product itself—apart from the value associated with the stand-
ard.” Id. 
 162. Id. at *44. 
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not worth the investment. If this reward does not provide an 
adequate incentive to participate, in the sense that the pat-
entee can get a higher value by remaining outside the stan-
dard, this simply means that the patented technology is more 
valuable outside the standard than as part of it.163 Further, it is 
the patentee who actually contributes to the standard who is 
entitled to a reward, not a patentee who might have been in-
cluded in the standard. This is necessary to provide the correct 
incentive to invent, given that it is only a patentee whose pat-
ent is actually infringed can sue for infringement and collect a 
royalty. 
As for Principle (2), in our framework the anti-royalty 
stacking principle is really just an outgrowth of proportionality: 
no individual patent should command a disproportionate share 
of its marginal contribution to the standard. The patentees as a 
group are entitled to only a part of the value of the standard to 
the user; because they cannot capture the user’s sunk costs, 
they cannot obtain more than the value to the user. Conse-
quently, the royalties cannot be excessive, in the sense that the 
user will always pay less in royalties than the standard is ac-
tually worth to it. Translated into practical terms, if the patent 
in suit contributes relatively little to the standard, but the roy-
alty sought by the patent owner multiplied by the number of 
other SEPs incorporated into the defendant’s product would ex-
ceed the revenue derived from that product, it is reasonable to 
infer that the royalty is disproportionate.164 
 
 163. Anne Layne-Farrar et al. consider an ex ante incremental value rule 
under which the patentee would be entitled to the incremental increase in ex-
pected value contributed by its patent, where the expected value turns on the 
increased probability of success if the patentee participates in the standard. 
See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 11, at 27, 29. They show that this rule does 
not ensure adequate participation because it does not fully distribute the prof-
its of a successful standard, so under plausible conditions the patentee will 
choose to stay out of the standard and negotiate participation ex post. Id. Our 
model avoids the participation problem they address because the profits of the 
successful standard are fully distributed to the participating patentees, so 
there is no advantage to be gained by staying out initially. 
 164. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 
2013 WL 5593609, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“[T]he court conclude[d] that 
royalty stacking may be a concern when setting a RAND rate to ensure that 
the asserted patents are not overvalued compared to the technological contri-
bution they make to the standard.”); Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *73 (not-
ing concerns due to the patent contributing little to the applicable standard). 
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2. Practical Implications 
One direct practical implication of our approach is that it is 
proper to award a running royalty either as damages for past 
infringement or as an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction. 
This may seem so unremarkable as to not be worth mentioning. 
Reasonable royalties are routinely awarded on the basis of a 
running royalty; no one has ever suggested that this is im-
proper,165 and we agree that it is not. But if we take seriously 
the principle that the SEP owner should not capture any of the 
value arising from network effects, the standard practice of 
awarding running royalties would be entirely wrong. The in-
creased social value of the standard due to network effects is 
partly reflected in increased value of the technology to individ-
ual users, but the most direct effect is on sales; more people will 
adopt the technology after standardization. That being so, any 
running royalty in which the amount owing to the patentee in-
creases with total sales will reflect in large part the increased 
value of the technology due to standardization. If the SEP 
owner were not entitled to capture any of the value arising on 
standardization, understood as including network effects, then 
the only proper reasonable royalty would be a lump sum based 
not on actual sales, but on the sales that would have been an-
ticipated had the technology never become part of the standard. 
The fact that no one has ever proposed such an absurd rule 
suggests to us that, whatever it might mean to say that the 
SEP owner is not entitled to capture the value arising on stan-
dardization, it cannot mean that the patentee is not entitled to 
any part of the value arising from network effects. 
A second direct implication of our approach relates to the 
timing of the hypothetical negotiation. Courts often refers to 
the hypothetical negotiation occurring just prior to the first in-
fringement,166 but the literature sometimes refers to a date 
prior to the incurring of sunk costs167 or prior to standardiza-
 
 165. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing a running royalty license, without any suggestion 
that it is improper). 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 1324 (“The hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing li-
censor-willing licensee’ approach . . . attempts to ascertain the royalty upon 
which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an 
agreement just before infringement began.”). 
 167. See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle 
of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 426 (2016) (“The hypothetical 
negotiation date should be set at just prior to the time that the infringer be-
came committed to using the infringing technology, which in most cases will 
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tion.168 While these dates sometimes coincide, this is by no 
means necessary either in theory or in practice. Consistent 
with a recent proposal by Lee and Melamed,169 under our ap-
proach the correct date is a date prior to the defendant’s having 
incurred sunk costs. Since this date may occur prior to in-
fringement, using the date of first infringement would facilitate 
the patentee’s ability to extract sunk costs. At the same time, 
the proposal that the hypothetical negotiation should take 
place prior to standardization is premised on the view that the 
patentee should not be able to capture any value arising from 
network effects, which is also inconsistent with our approach. 
Nevertheless, choosing the correct date is not quite as crucial 
under our approach because whichever date is chosen, the ne-
gotiation is assumed to take place will full ex post knowledge 
(so a date that is too early, at least, makes no difference). Fur-
ther, we emphasize that the notion of an ex ante hypothetical 
negotiation is only a mechanism to ensure that sunk costs 
holdup is not permitted; so long as the particular evidence used 
to assess the reasonable royalty does not itself reflect sunk 
costs, the exact date of the negotiation is irrelevant. 
Beyond this, our proposed approach can help courts to de-
termine which evidence and methodologies should be admitted 
in evidence (possibly with modifications), and which should not. 
For example, courts often consider comparable licenses as a 
guide to determining the royalty a willing licensor and licensee 
would have agreed to,170 and our approach can be useful in ana-
lyzing which licenses should be considered comparable. In gen-
eral, licenses that were negotiated against a backdrop of un-
patented alternatives are more likely to be comparable under 
our approach than would licenses negotiated ex post against a 
threat of injunctive relief (which would enable the licensor to 
extract a portion of sunk costs).171 In addition to these simple 
 
be the lock-in date.”). 
 168. See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 55, at 1491–92 (considering the 
positive impact of having the hypothetical negotiation prior to standardiza-
tion). 
 169. See Lee & Melamed, supra note 167. 
 170. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1305 (using rates paid for 
comparable licenses as a guide in determining if the jury’s royalty payment 
assessment in determining damages was reasonable). 
 171. Though whether licensors routinely do extract sunk costs is, ultimate-
ly, an empirical issue. See Wright, supra note 65, at 807 (“Although the rate 
negotiated with the injunction threat is likely greater than the rate negotiated 
without the threat of injunction, it does not follow that the former is above 
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observations, however, we can also use our approach to evalu-
ate the methodologies the courts have approved in the cases 
thus far. 
For example, in Microsoft two families of patents were at 
issue, one relating to the Wi-Fi 802.11 standard, the other to 
the H.264 video coding standard.172 In addressing the Wi-Fi 
standard, the court applied the proportionality principle to ex-
clude consideration of a majority of the asserted Wi-Fi patents 
on the basis that even if they were essential to the standard, it 
was not alleged that they were practiced by the Microsoft prod-
ucts at issue.173 Judge Robart also gave extensive consideration 
to the importance of the asserted patents to the standard and 
to Microsoft’s products in particular, concluding that the pat-
ents related to the H.264 standard generally provided only a 
modest contribution to the standard, and those related to the 
802.11 standard generally provided very little contribution to 
the standard.174 As a consequence, the court held that Motorola 
was not entitled to any increase in the FRAND rate that had 
been derived from the best comparable license for the H.264 
patents,175 and for the 802.11 patents the court held the stan-
dard rate derived from the comparable license represented a 
ceiling which was likely higher than the appropriate FRAND 
rate.176 These uses of proportionality are consistent with our 
recommended approach. 
On the other hand, with regard to the relevance of ex ante 
alternatives our analysis is somewhat different from that of 
Judge Robart, who considered whether there were ex ante al-
ternatives to the patents at issue without distinguishing be-
tween patented and unpatented alternatives.177 Under our ap-
 
F/RAND.”). 
 172. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 173. See id. at *55 (discussing the 802.11 patents). 
 174. Id. at *84, *98. Judge Robart held that the remaining Wi-Fi patents 
generally contributed very little to the standard. Id. at *57–58, *60, *63. The 
patents related to the H.264 standard were somewhat more important to that 
standard. See id. at *28–29, *32–33, *39 (analyzing the importance of the pa-
tents related to H.264 in relation to that standard). However, that importance 
was substantially diminished because almost all of them (fourteen of sixteen) 
related only to interlaced video, which was of minimal importance to Mi-
crosoft’s products. Id. at *39, *42, *47–49. 
 175. Id. at *86. 
 176. Id. at *92. 
 177. See id. at *53 (“If viable alternatives existed, the patents are less im-
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proach, only the latter would be relevant.178 Nevertheless, on 
the facts the court held that that availability of alternatives 
had not been established or that the selected technology was 
superior,179 so the availability of ex ante alternatives (patented 
or not) did not have any impact on the outcome. Similarly, 
Judge Robart cited as the theoretical ideal the incremental ex 
ante approach that our proposal rejects,180 but when he actually 
came to apply the principle that a patentee is only entitled to 
the value of its technology, he interpreted it in a manner con-
sistent with our approach, as meaning that the patentee is not 
entitled to a disproportionate share of the royalties.181 
Ultimately, the court in Microsoft based the FRAND rate 
ranges on comparable rates charged by patent pools,182 despite 
noting a number of shortcomings with pools generally as 
comparables. We agree with the court’s assessment of at least 
some of these shortcomings,183 but there is one criticism that we 
view as misplaced: namely, its concern that: 
[P]atent pools do not use an incremental value approach, an approach 
that is required in the court’s hypothetical negotiation paradigm. In 
other words, patent pools do not try to determine the incremental 
value of every patent in the pool compared to alternatives that were 
available prior to defining the standard.184 
As noted above, however, the court did not distinguish between 
patented and unpatented alternatives, and under our approach 
the failure to consider the incremental value over patented al-
 
portant to the standard and will be valued accordingly.”); see also id. at *38 
(considering an alternative which was identified as patented). 
 178. See infra Appendix B. 
 179. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *28, *30, *36, *38, *41–42 (H.264 
patents); id. at *54 (802.11 patents). 
 180. See id. at *14. 
 181. See id. at *42. 
 182. See id. at *82 (discussing the MPEG LA H.264 pool for the video cod-
ing patents); id. At *89 (discussing the Via Licensing 802.11 patent pool for 
Motorola’s 802.11 SEP portfolio). The court rejected the various licenses sug-
gested by Motorola as comparables for reasons unrelated to our approach, 
such as the fact that they were negotiated under threat of a potential in-
fringement action or were part of a larger license of both standard-essential 
and other patents. Id. at *67, *69, *71–72. 
 183. For example, Judge Robart stated that “the patent-counting royalty 
allocation structure of pools does not consider the importance of a particular 
SEP to the standard or to the implementer’s products.” Id. at *80. His concern 
that patent counting (numeric proportionality) might reduce the incentive to 
participate for patentees with valuable patents, id., is fundamentally the same 
as ours. 
 184. Id. at *80 (citation omitted). 
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ternatives is not a defect at all,185 while the failure to consider 
unpatented alternatives is important only if there is evidence 
that there were unpatented alternatives that might have made 
a similar contribution (which there was not in this case). More 
generally, the use of patent pools can be consistent with our 
theory. We have argued that the appropriate benchmark for a 
FRAND royalty is that the total royalty paid by the user should 
be the same as the royalty that a user would pay to a single pa-
tentee holding all the relevant patents. An ideal pool would do 
exactly this, and the balance which a pool seeks between wide-
spread adoption and income for the patentees186 is the same 
trade-off which would be faced by a single patentee seeking to 
maximize its revenue without pricing itself out of the market. 
Most of the problems with using pools as comparators relate to 
the distribution of the royalties among the various licensors 
with patents of differing value.187 This is certainly an important 
problem from the patentee’s perspective, but from the user per-
spective, which is to say in terms of the total royalty payable to 
license a standard, a successful patent pool is the best possible 
comparator. 
Similarly, the court’s analysis in Innovatio188 is broadly 
consistent with our approach. In Innovatio, Judge Holderman 
employed what was referred to in the case as a “Top Down” ap-
proach by, first, determining the applicable royalty base (here, 
a Wi-Fi chip, which the court determined was the smallest sal-
able patent practicing unit);189 second, calculating the average 
 
 185. See infra Appendix B. 
 186. See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *82 (“[The] two cornerstones of 
the RAND obligation [are]: (1) . . . to create valuable standards, while at the 
same time, (2) ensuring widespread adoption.”). 
 187. Id. at *80. The other main problem is that in some pools, important 
licensors are also users, which means they are willing to accept less than their 
proportionate share of the standard as licensors because of the compensating 
benefit of a low rate to them in their role as licensees. Id. at *81. Judge Robart 
acknowledged this problem and explicitly accounted for it in his FRAND rate 
calculation. See id. at *81, *85. 
 188. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 
WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 189. See id. at *12–18. In a series of decisions, the Federal Circuit has held 
that the “entire market value” of an end product may serve as a royalty base 
only when “the patented feature drives the demand for an entire multi-
component product.” LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 
51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As a general rule, the correct base is the “smallest sal-
able patent-practicing unit.” Id. (quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283, 287–88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)); see also Virnetx, Inc. 
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that, even 
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sales price of a chip over what the court viewed as the relevant 
time period ($14.85);190 third, multiplying that price by the av-
erage profit margin over that period (12.1 percent), thus lower-
ing the base to $1.80;191 fourth, multiplying the base by eighty-
four percent, the value believed “attributable to the top 10% of 
802.11 standard-essential patents, to obtain $1.51”;192 and fifth, 
multiplying $1.51 by 19/300, based on an estimate that there 
are approximately 3000 patents essential to the standard at is-
sue (resulting in 300 falling within the “top 10%”) and that In-
novatio’s 19 SEPs (which the court viewed as moderate to mod-
erate-high in importance) were among these 300 top patents.193 
Consistent with our proposal, this approach eliminated the risk 
of royalty stacking and accorded proportionately more value to 
the patents deemed important to the standard.194 
That said, we would suggest some modifications that would 
conform the top-down approach more closely to our own. First, 
and perhaps most importantly, Judge Holderman reconstructed 
the average chip price from 1997 (the date of the hypothetical 
negotiation) to 2013 (by which date all but three of the patents 
had expired), to calculate a royalty base of $14.85.195 In doing 
so, Judge Holderman rejected the expert’s proposal to use a 
weighted average of $3.99—which reflected much lower chip 
prices in the later years as the number of units sold increased 
(from 5.4 million in 2000 to over 2 billion in 2015)—reasoning 
that the increase in chip sales was “due to the increased de-
mand for Wi-Fi products resulting from the interoperability of 
the products due to standardization,” and that the court must 
 
after identification of the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, further ap-
portionment may be necessary). 
 190. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *41. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at *43 (“[T]he top 10% of all electronics patents account for 84% of 
the value in all electronics patents.” (citing Mark Schankerman, How Valuable 
Is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 94 
tbl.5 & n.12 (1998))). Whether this estimate still holds poses an interesting 
question. See Sidak, supra note 14, at 1019–20, for discussion in the context of 
IEEE’s 802.11 wireless standard. 
 193. Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38–39, *43. The court noted, howev-
er, that “many of those 3000 patents are likely less valuable to the standard 
than Innovatio’s patents because their essentiality has not been judicially con-
firmed.” Id. at *43. 
 194. See id. (according more value to the patents deemed important). 
 195. Id. at *41. Because the relevant data went back only to 2000, Judge 
Holderman assumed that the average price per chip during 1997–99 was the 
same as the average price for 2000. Id. 
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“not consider the effect of standardization when evaluating the 
ex ante negotiation in 1997.”196 In our view, however, it would 
have been appropriate to use the lower number. Under the con-
tingent ex ante framework, the relevant question is what royal-
ty the parties would have agreed to ex ante, with the benefit of 
all relevant ex post information (here, the fact that the stand-
ard was successful and that chip prices declined more rapidly 
in recent years). Using this ex post information in Innovatio ac-
tually might have resulted in a lower royalty rate.197 Second, for 
somewhat more technical reasons, we question whether the 
court was correct to reduce the base by the average profit mar-
gin on sales of Wi-Fi chips during the period in question.198 
 
 196. Id. at *39–41. 
 197. We say “might,” because, as discussed infra note 198, we are not sure 
that the court’s next step, of reducing the base by the average profit margin 
per chip, was correct. In theory it is also debatable whether the base should 
normally be the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, or whether it could be 
the revenue from sales of the entire infringing device (as may be common out-
side the litigation setting). See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 
1201, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[Jury] instructions [must] fully explain the need 
to apportion the ultimate royalty award to the incremental value of the pa-
tented feature from the overall product.”). Courts in the U.S. prefer use of the 
smallest salable patent-practicing unit largely out of concern that juries will 
otherwise award inappropriately large royalties, even though (as a matter of 
theory) a large base multiplied by a smaller rate could be identical to a small 
base multiplied by a larger rate. Id. at 1226–27. In the context of a top-down 
approach, however, use of the smallest salable patent-practicing does have the 
advantage of eliminating from consideration all of the SEPs that read on other 
components of a multicomponent end product. 
Somewhat in contrast to the court in Innovatio, the district court in Mi-
crosoft “did to an extent take into account” ex post information, specifically 
“the present-day value to Microsoft of Motorola’s patents” in concluding that “a 
third-party valuation of Motorola’s 802.11 SEPs was only somewhat probative 
because, at the time of the valuation, ‘Motorola’s 802.11 SEP portfolio’ was 
much larger than the portfolio ‘as it exists today.’” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *97 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013)). 
The appellate court found no error in this, stating that “it would have been 
impracticable for the court to consider only such evidence as could pinpoint the 
value of Motorola’s patents to Microsoft at a precise point in time” and noting, 
among other things, “the need for flexibility in determining a royalty rate for a 
RAND-encumbered patent.” Id. at 1042. 
 198. The rationale for using the average profit was to “isolate[ ] the portion 
of the income from the sale of the chip available to the chipmaker to pay royal-
ties on intellectual property,” but the logic is not obvious. Innovatio, 2013 WL 
5593609, at *38. Realistically, one might expect that some portion of the 
$13.05 cost of producing chips ($14.85 less the $1.80 profit margin calculated 
by Judge Holderman) was itself due to payment of royalties for some of the 
other 3000 or so patents (though presumably some of them may not have been 
licensed ahead of time). Moreover, even if we ignore that point, the court’s 
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Finally, there’s Ericsson, one of the few appellate decisions 
to date to address the subject of FRAND royalties. Correctly in 
our view, the Ericsson court stressed the need for the royalty to 
be proportionate in the sense that an SEP making only a small 
contribution to the standard should receive a commensurately 
small royalty, not one that reflects the value of the standard as 
a whole.199 Nevertheless, as noted in the Introduction, the Er-
icsson court also emphasized that the “royalty must be prem-
ised on the value of the patented feature, not any value added 
by the standard’s adoption of the patented technology.”200 We 
have shown that the distinction between the value of the tech-
nology and the value added by standardization is by no means 
clear,201 and that the latter term has been used to refer to sunk 
costs holdup, network value appropriation, and the problem of 
apportionment. As we have noted, these concepts are routinely 
conflated, and Ericsson is no exception, so it is not clear how 
that instruction is to be understood—though the court did seem 
to view its concern about capturing the value added by stand-
 
analysis seems to contemplate all of the chip maker’s profits potentially being 
eaten up by IP rights (if all 3000 SEP owners demanded royalties), which 
seems unlikely. In theory, a better method would have been to determine what 
portion of the cost of producing chips is typically attributable to IP and what 
portion is attributable to other factors, and then to divide up the “IP portion” 
in accordance with the importance of the patents in suit. One recent study, for 
example, claims that about twenty-five percent of the cost of producing an en-
tire smartphone goes to patent royalties. Ann Armstrong et al., The 
Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components 
Within Modern Smartphones 2 (May 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443848. We make no claims concerning the accuracy 
of this number. Such information may not be available, however, in which case 
perhaps there is no obvious way to avoid some arbitrary limitation. 
 199. See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232–33 (“Just as we apportion damages for 
a patent that covers a small part of a device, we must also apportion damages 
for SEPs that cover only a small part of a standard. In other words, a royalty 
award for a SEP must be apportioned to the value of the patented invention 
(or at least to the approximate value thereof), not the value of the standard as 
a whole.”). 
 200. Id. at 1232; see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. 
CISCO Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (vacating a damages 
award, on the ground that “the district court erred in failing to account for 
value accruing to the ‘069 patent from the standard’s adoption”); Ericsson, 773 
F.3d, at 1233 (concluding that “Supreme Court precedent also requires appor-
tionment of the value of the patented technology from the value of its stand-
ardization,” and that the jury “must be told to consider the difference between 
the added value of the technological invention and the added value of that in-
vention’s standardization”). 
 201. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
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ardization as distinct from the problem of apportionment,202 and 
it addressed sunk costs holdup separately.203 To the extent the 
Ericsson court did mean that the patentee is not entitled to ap-
propriate any of the value of the standard, this holding is in-
consistent with our theory. We therefore urge the Federal Cir-
cuit to distance itself from this interpretation in the future. 
Moreover, given the court’s suggestion that “[t]rial courts 
should . . . consider the patentee’s actual RAND commitment in 
crafting the jury instruction,”204 we submit that courts can and 
should interpret the IEEE-SA Bylaw “excluding the value, if 
any, resulting from the inclusion of [an SEP] in the IEEE 
Standard”205 in a manner that is consistent with our approach. 
  CONCLUSION   
Courts and commentators have proposed various principles 
for calculating FRAND royalties, among them that the royalty 
should not reflect “the value of the standard.” As we have 
shown, however, this principle could be understood to mean 
 
 202. See Ericsson, 774 F.3d at 1235 (“[D]istrict courts must make clear to 
the jury that any royalty award must be based on the incremental value of the 
invention, not the value of the standard as a whole or any increased value the 
patented feature gains from its inclusion in the standard.”); see also id. at 
1231 (stating that some of the Georgia-Pacific factors “need to be adjusted for 
RAND-encumbered patents,” because the use of such patents is inflated due to 
their essentiality). 
 203. Id. at 1233–34. 
 204. Id. at 1231. 
 205. IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS 6.1 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. 
ENG’RS, INC. 2015), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws 
.pdf. In another document, however, the IEEE-SA states that: 
As a hypothetical example, during the development of a standard, a 
Working Group considers alternatives and makes a decision based on 
many factors. Suppose two and only two alternative technologies are 
available, both patented and both offering the same performance, im-
plementation cost, and all other qualities. Therefore, the value of the 
two options is exactly the same, although only one will be selected. 
Any additional value imputed to the selected option because of its in-
clusion in the standard is excluded. 
UNDERSTANDING PATENT ISSUES DURING IEEE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
13–14 (INST. OF ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS STANDARDS ASS’N 2016), https:// 
standards.ieee.org/faqs/patents.pdf. The U.S. Department of Justice neverthe-
less interprets IEEE-SA’s definition of “Reasonable Rate” as excluding “value 
arising from the cost or inability of implementers to switch from technologies 
included in a standard,” which is what we mean by sunk costs holdup. Letter 
from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Anti-
trust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, Esquire, Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/04/311470 
.docx. 
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any or all of three distinct concepts: that the royalty should not 
reflect the implementer’s sunk costs; that the patentee should 
not extract any of the value resulting from network effects; or 
that the royalty should be proportionate to the patent’s contri-
bution to the standard. Failure to distinguish among them, or 
to classify all three as manifestations of holdup, results in 
questionable policy prescriptions, because only the sunk costs 
and proportionality problems are associated with static or dy-
namic inefficiency. 
This Article has proposed the combination of a contingent 
ex ante framework for calculating reasonable royalties with ex 
post Shapley pricing, resulting in the foundational principle 
that a FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental contribu-
tion of the patent to the value of the standard to the user. As 
we have shown, our proposal would prevent patentees from ex-
tracting sunk costs or a disproportionate share of standard 
value, but (contrary to some other proposed approaches) it 
would enable them to draw some of the increased value result-
ing from network effects. Moreover, our framework interprets 
the various principles articulated to date in a manner that is 
largely consistent with the decided cases and that will enable 
courts to apply those principles coherently and consistently 
with sound innovation policy. Finally, while abstract, the pro-
posal can be used as a benchmark for determining which types 
of practical evidence and methodologies courts should admit as 
proxies for the ideal approach.  
  Appendices to The Value of the Standard   
Our discussion in the main body of the article describes the 
determination of a reasonable royalty as involving a hypotheti-
cal three-stage process. That description isolates some of the 
key features of our approach. These Appendices provide a more 
detailed technical explanation of our approach, though we do 
not provide a fully formal model. Appendix A provides a basic 
theoretical justification for the use of the Shapley value. Ap-
pendix B addresses two technical questions, namely whether 
the hypothetical negotiation is carried out by individual users 
or by users as a group, and how to deal with ex ante competi-
tion to be included in the standard. 
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I.  APPENDIX A   
In the main text we propose that FRAND royalties be de-
termined by the incremental contribution of the patent to the 
value of the standard to the user, where the incremental value 
is determined by ex post Shapley pricing. This Appendix justi-
fies the use of Shapley pricing.206 We argue that the setting of a 
FRAND royalty should be conceptualized as the outcome of a 
cooperative game with transferable utility. Adopting the 
Shapley value as the solution concept flows naturally from this 
basic modeling choice. 
In game theory, cooperative games are those in which 
players are able to enter into binding commitments.207 In non-
cooperative games, in contrast, players act independently; they 
may anticipate how others will respond and adjust their behav-
ior accordingly, but they do not have the ability to bind each 
other to any particular course of action.208 For example, the fa-
mous Prisoners’ Dilemma is a non-cooperative game in which 
the dilemma arises because neither player can bind the other to 
the choice that is in their mutual best interest.209 If the same 
problem were modeled as a cooperative game, the players 
would be able to enter into a binding agreement not to defect. 
A basic question is whether the FRAND process should be 
modeled as a cooperative or non-cooperative game. In our view, 
the choice is clear. The patent system itself can only be modeled 
as a cooperative game. The central justification for the patent 
system is that without the ability to make binding commit-
ments between agents—namely innovators and users—
innovation incentives reduce to a prisoners’ dilemma: if the in-
ventor “cooperates” by inventing, it is in the user’s interest to 
“defect” by buying a cheaper copy from a free-rider who did not 
incur the sunk costs of invention. Anticipating this, the inven-
tor will “defect” by not investing in invention. If the user coop-
erates by paying up front, it is in the inventor’s interest to de-
fect by not investing sunk costs in invention. The patent system 
solves this dilemma by (in effect) allowing the user to make a 
binding commitment to pay if it chooses to use the invention. 
The property right granted by the state to the inventor repre-
 
 206. The use of ex post information is addressed in the main text and in 
our companion article, Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 15. 
 207. See OSBORNE & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 113, at 2. 
 208. See id. 
 209. Id. at 16. 
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sents the binding commitment by users as a group to “cooper-
ate” by paying for the invention if the patentee “cooperates” by 
inventing. This binding commitment by users is fundamental to 
the patent system, and it directly implies that the patent sys-
tem must be modeled as a cooperative game. 
In contrast, the Swanson and Baumol model ignores this 
central feature of the patent system. As they acknowledge, 
their model is a purely static one, in which “all investments in 
R&D by the patent holders already have been sunk.”210 It is be-
cause of this assumption that each patentee is bid down to its 
incremental marginal value as compared with other patentees. 
But this assumption begs the central question of the patent 
system: why would anyone ever develop an invention knowing 
that they would not receive any reward? In effect, the auction 
model applies non-cooperative game theory to an incompletely 
specified game. If we were to try to model the patent system as 
a non-cooperative game, we would have to complete the back-
ward induction process and ask whether the patentee would 
have had an incentive to invent the invention in the first place. 
As discussed in the main text, the answer is that they would 
not: the entire incentive system would degenerate into the de-
fect/defect solution of the non-cooperative Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
which is why the patent system cannot be modeled as a non-
cooperative game.211 On the other hand, if we treat the patent 
system as a cooperative game, we cannot accept Swanson and 
Baumol’s premise that the inventor’s costs are already sunk 
when the royalties are decided. 
It is sometimes said that cooperative game solutions for-
malize notions of fairness and distributive justice, while non-
cooperative games are concerned with efficiency.212 That is mis-
leading. While cooperative game theory does reflect a fairness 
concept, efficiency as a normative principle also relies ulti-
mately on a particular notion of fairness, namely on the princi-
ple that a just reward to an input factor is its marginal produc-
tivity, as reflected in a competitive market paradigm.213 And the 
 
 210. Swanson & Baumol, supra note 50, at 18. 
 211. See supra Part II.C. 
 212. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 14, at 685, 693 (describing 
the Swanson & Baumol model as being “rooted in the concept of economic effi-
ciency,” while cooperative game theory relates to “concepts of fairness”). 
 213. See, e.g., Young, supra note 113 (“In a perfectly competitive market, 
the wage of a laborer equals his marginal product. No ethical judgment need 
be made as to whether marginal productivity is a ‘just’ rule of compensation so 
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fairness principle underpinning the Shapley value as a solution 
concept for cooperative games is fundamentally the same, 
namely “the idea that rewards should be in proportion to con-
tributions.”214 The difference is that cooperative game theory al-
lows us to define what is meant by “marginal contribution” 
when outputs are superadditive. As H. Peyton Young has ex-
plained: 
In theory, marginal cost pricing is the only pricing mechanism that is 
consistent with economic efficiency in the large. Unfortunately it is 
typically unworkable as a cost allocation method because marginal 
costs need not sum to total costs, as required for an allocation. Indeed, 
marginal cost pricing may not even cover costs. This possibility arises 
in natural monopolies characterized by increasing returns to scale 
and declining marginal costs, such as distribution networks for trans-
port, electric power, water, and communications services.215 
The problem that marginal cost pricing may not cover costs be-
cause of increasing returns to scale is exactly the problem 
which justifies the patent system. It is the failure to cover 
costs, consequent on adoption of marginal cost pricing, which 
makes incremental ex ante pricing inadequate as an approach 
to FRAND royalties. 
The early work on applications of Shapley value was ex-
plicitly concerned with efficient production in a decentralized 
firm with joint costs.216 The magic of ideal markets generally is 
that individuals will make decisions that are socially optimal, 
based only on price information.217 However, the classical mar-
ket described by non-cooperative game theory fails when deci-
sions by one player impose costs or benefits on another. Super-
additive games are those in which the two players together 
produce more than the sum of what they can produce individu-
ally;218 for example, any standard involving complementary 
patents is superadditive. Superadditive games cannot be opti-
mally solved in a non-cooperative market because the synergy 
from the combination is an externality to each individual 
 
long as competitive markets are accepted as the correct form of economic or-
ganization.” (emphasis added)). 
 214. Id. 
 215. H.P. Young, Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation, 53 ECONOMETRICA 
757, 757 (1985). 
 216. See, e.g., Martin Shubik, Incentives, Decentralized Control, the As-
signment of Joint Costs, and Internal Pricing, 8 MGT. SCI. 325, 326–28 (1962). 
 217. Of course real markets are never ideal, but nonetheless, that is the 
attraction. 
 218. See OSBORNE & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 113, at 258. 
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agent.219 The market response is the firm, but the firm simply 
shifts the focus of the problem.220 If the manager of the firm has 
full information about costs and benefits, she can simply order 
individual agents to act for the greater good of the firm as a 
whole, rather than in their narrow self-interest. But in any 
large firm higher-level managers will not have full information 
about each division. Information is often compressed through 
profit and loss statements based on decision centers within the 
firm, and the division is given direction through incentives pro-
vided by bonuses or increased resource allocation based on 
those statements. Thus there is a managerial problem of decen-
tralized decision making: how to allocate resources among divi-
sions so as to maximize the overall firm profit, while knowing 
only how each division’s output contributes to the profit of the 
whole (but not the specifics about how each division is run). As 
Shubik notes, “An optimally decentralized system will have the 
property that the net effect of all individual actions will be 
more favorable to the firm than the actions selected by any 
other array of decision centers.”221 If, on the other hand, the 
wrong cost allocation method is chosen, “it is possible that indi-
vidual rational action based upon the cost assignment may add 
up to corporate idiocy.”222 Thus, it is necessary to design a re-
ward structure “so that the selection of choices which are best 
for the individual decision-maker will always coincide with 
those which are best for the organization,”223 and “[a] goal of 
good management should be to design a reward system for 
those who take risks in making decisions in such a manner that 
the rewards to the individual correlate positively with the 
worth of the decision to the organization.”224 This is not a mat-
ter of fairness, but rather of corporate efficiency. A firm that 
rewards its subordinate decision-makers for contributing to the 
worth of the firm as a whole will eventually prevail over a firm 
that does otherwise. 
 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 
(1937), reprinted in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 
(1988). 
 221. See Shubik, supra note 216, at 329. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 328. 
 224. Id. at 325; see also Young, supra note 215 (“A reasonable goal of good 
management is to adopt a system of incentives that rewards individuals for 
making decisions that increase the firm’s overall profits and penalizes deci-
sions that damage profits.”). 
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The patent system addresses what is fundamentally the 
same system of decentralized decision making with limited in-
formation. As is often noted, if the government knew what in-
ventions would be best for society as a whole, it could simply 
fund them directly.225 This corresponds to the situation where a 
manager has sufficient information to simply direct the em-
ployees to act optimally. This does occur sometimes, both for 
firms and governments, but it is not a general solution to the 
problem. The problem of FRAND royalties for complementary 
patented technologies is exactly analogous to the managerial 
problem of how to allocate resources so as to encourage decen-
tralized decision makers to act for the benefit of the whole. 
It is this problem which is solved by Shapley pricing.226 As 
discussed in more detail below, Shapley value provides the only 
solution to this problem that is consistent with a few simple 
axioms. As such, it is “the natural interpretation[] of marginal-
ism in problems of pure cooperation”227 with transferable util-
ity. Thus the difference between market efficiency and Shapley 
pricing is technical, not philosophical. 
Consider a simple example which illustrates the problem 
that is addressed by Shapley pricing. Suppose A has a patented 
battery-saving technology covered by one patent and B has pat-
ented a cellular communication technology also covered by one 
patent, and these products are embodied in a smartphone. 
There is a user, X, who uses her phone while working out of the 
office visiting clients. The battery-saving technology is worth $1 
on its own, because without the cellular communication capa-
bility the phone can only be used for playing games, while a 
phone with only the cellular technology is worth $10; but the 
two together are worth $15 because they allow the phone to be 
used for a full business day without recharging. Technology A 
adds $1 in combination with unpatented technologies, and $5 
in combination with B. A full description of A’s marginal con-
tribution to the value of the phone in the hands of X is ($1, $5), 
to reflect both of these possibilities. Now suppose there is an-
other user, Y, who works in an office and who likes to play bat-
 
 225. See supra note 100 for articles discussing the benefits of patents over 
prizes. 
 226. See Young, supra note 215 (motivating the discussion of Aumann-
Shapley pricing, a generalization of Shapley pricing to continuous production 
functions, by focusing on “the incentives that different cost accounting meth-
ods create for the adoption of more efficient techniques of production”). 
 227. Young, supra note 113, at 268. 
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tery-draining video games on his phone while commuting. For 
Y, the battery-saving technology is relatively more important, 
and the cellular communication is less important. Suppose that 
for Y the battery-saving technology is worth $2 on its own, the 
cellular technology is worth $7, and the two together are worth 
$13. The marginal contribution of technology A to user Y ($2, 
$6) is higher in all respects—both in combination with unpat-
ented technology, and in combination with technology B—than 
for user X. On the other hand, the total value of the bundle to Y 
is less than for user X. The marginality principle says that the 
payoff to A from user Y should be higher than the payoff from 
user X, even though the technology as a bundle is worth less to 
Y than to X.228 The intuition is that the marginal contribution 
made by the battery-saving technology to user Y is higher any 
way you look at it—whether relative to a system with or with-
out cellular technology—so the incremental value of that tech-
nology to user Y must be higher than its incremental value to 
user B. This of course implies that the royalty that Y pays to B 
must be less than the royalty that X pays to B (though it does 
not imply that the royalty Y pays to B will be less than the roy-
alty Y pays to A). 
As a matter both of law and fairness we need to assess roy-
alties that reflect the importance of each technology to the us-
ers, and ideally which reflect the technologies’ marginal values. 
But it is not clear how to define the marginal value. Should we 
say that A should receive $5 from user X and $6 from user Y, 
because that is how much value A adds relative to B alone? 
That would imply that B would get $10 and $7, respectively. Or 
should we say that B should get $14 from X and $11 from Y, 
because that is how much B adds to A alone? That would imply 
that A gets $1 and $2, respectively, which is much less than if 
we look at it from A’s perspective. 
The Shapley value sharing rule (described in the main 
text)229 is a solution to this problem that satisfies three intui-
tively appealing axioms: (1) symmetry; (2) full distribution; and 
(3) marginality.230 The symmetry principle requires that players 
 
 228. See H.P. Young, Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games, 14 INT’L J. 
GAME THEORY 65, 81 (1985) (providing a definition of the marginality princi-
ple). 
 229. See supra Part II.E. 
 230. See Shapley, supra note 112, at 308–09. The Shapley value can be de-
rived from a number of related sets of axioms. This particular axiomization is 
due to H.P. Young. Young, supra note 228; see also Young, supra note 215. We 
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who make the same contribution to the value of the standard 
(the payoff) must be treated in the same way.231 A general prob-
lem with cooperative games is that coalitions may form solely 
in order to extract value from another player. For example, if 
the game has three players A, B, and C, all of whom can pro-
duce nothing individually, $10 in collaboration with one other 
player and $60 in collaboration with both other players, the in-
tuitively fair solution would be that all three cooperate and 
each receives a payoff of $20. However, A and B might agree to 
present C with a take-it-or-leave-it offer in which A and B 
would cooperate with C only if C agreed to accept $12, while A 
and B each received $24. The symmetry axiom prohibits this 
kind of bargain. The full distribution axiom requires that the 
payoff is fully distributed: that is, the parties do not leave 
money on the table.232 The third axiom, marginality, captures 
the notion that a player’s payoff should depend only on its own 
marginal contribution to the overall output.233 In a cooperative 
game, the player’s marginal contribution is not a single num-
ber; it is described by the function or vector that describes the 
player’s marginal contribution to all possible coalitions. The 
marginality principle says that if A’s marginal contribution in-
creases in some respect, but does not decrease in any respect, 
then A’s royalty must increase. 
It turns out that the Shapley value is the only sharing rule 
which satisfies all of these principles.234 In our example, using 
Shapley pricing A would get $3 from user X and $4 from user Y, 
while B would get $12 and $9, respectively.235 This seems intui-
 
use it because it relates naturally to the relevant legal principles. The full dis-
tribution axiom is often called “efficiency.” The term “efficiency” is confusing, 
both because it does not mean the same thing as in the general economics lit-
erature and because it is not used consistently even in the cooperative game 
theory literature. We will therefore avoid it. Shapley’s original principles were 
symmetry, the carrier axiom and additivity. Alvin E. Roth, Introduction to the 
Shapley Value, in THE SHAPLEY VALUE, supra note 113, at 1, 5. The carrier 
axiom (referred to by Shapley as “efficiency,” but more commonly known as 
the carrier axiom) has two components, namely full distribution and the null 
player axiom. Id. For that reason the Shapley value is often characterized as 
being based on four axioms. See, e.g., MICHAEL MASCHLER ET AL., GAME THE-
ORY 749–51 (2013). Young’s marginality axiom can be derived from additivity 
and the null player axiom. See Young, supra note 228, at 71. 
 231. See Shapley, supra note 112, at 309–10. 
 232. See Roth, supra note 230, (referring to full distribution as “efficient”). 
 233. Young, supra note 113, at 268. 
 234. Roth, supra note 230. 
 235. This is a simplification. We endorse a bargaining model in which the 
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tively sound; B gets more from both X and Y than does A, be-
cause B’s technology is more important to both X and Y,236 but A 
gets relatively more from Y than from X because A’s technology 
is relatively more important to Y. This, we suggest, reflects the 
legal principles that “the patentee’s royalty must be premised 
on the value of the patented feature,”237 and “a patent that is 
extremely important and central to the standard would rea-
sonably command a higher royalty rate than a less important 
patent.”238 
In summary, the patent system and the FRAND rate set-
ting process in particular should be understood as a cooperative 
game with transferable utility. The FRAND commitment by the 
patentee to the user is a commitment not to charge excessive 
royalties, but at the same time the patent system is a commit-
ment by users to pay adequate royalties. We are seeking a solu-
tion which provides the patentee with the optimal incentive to 
invent; as with a traditional efficiency analysis, the incentive is 
both socially optimal and fair if it reflects the patentee’s mar-
ginal contribution. This is reflected in the notion that under-
pins Shapley pricing, namely that “rewards should be in pro-
portion to contributions,” as well as in the legal principle that 
“the parties in a hypothetical negotiation would set RAND roy-
alty rates by looking at the importance of the SEPs to the stan-
dard and the importance of the standard and the SEPs to the 
products at issue.”239 We therefore suggest that the FRAND 
 
patentee is not necessarily entitled to the full social surplus attributable to its 
invention. Consequently, it is more precise to say that A would bargain with X 
over how to split the $3 marginal benefit attributable to X’s invention, and so 
on. 
 236. The marginal benefit of B’s technology to X is ($10, $14) and to Y is 
($7, $11). 
 237. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 238. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 
2111217, at *20 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff ’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 239. Id. at *3; see also In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 
11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Imagine, for ex-
ample, that the court has determined that a given patent portfolio provides 
25% of the functionality of a standard, and that the court is considering a pro-
posed RAND rate based on that determination. Logically, the other standard-
essential patents outside of the portfolio should comprise 75% of the value of 
the standard, or three times the value of the asserted portfolio.”). The margin-
ality principle excludes a sharing rule based on the number of patents held by 
a patentee. Numerical sharing would imply that A gets $7.50 from X but only 
$6.50 from Y, even though A’s technology is relatively more valuable to Y. Un-
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royalty setting problem is properly conceptualized as a coopera-
tive game, and Shapley pricing is the appropriate solution. 
II.  APPENDIX B   
This Appendix addresses two technical questions, namely 
whether the hypothetical negotiation is carried out by individ-
ual users or by users as a group, and how to deal with ex ante 
competition to be included in the standard. 
A. INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP NEGOTIATIONS? 
In describing our approach in the main text we referred to 
the SSO negotiating with “users,” with intentional ambiguity 
as to whether the negotiation would be with one user at a time, 
or with users as a group.240 In our view, the correct approach in 
principle is that the negotiation is with one user at a time; each 
individual user bargains with each patentee to split the 
Shapley value of that patentee’s contribution to the value of the 
standard in the hands of that particular user.241 This is consis-
tent with the case law, which indicates that the royalty should 
reflect the value of the patent to the standard as well as the 
value to the particular user. But the value of the patent to the 
standard has no independent content; it is nothing but the ag-
gregate of the value of the patent to all the individual users. 
Consequently, considering the value of the standard to each 
 
der numerical sharing, A’s royalty does not depend on its own merits alone; A 
suffers because B’s technology is less valuable. Consistent with the marginal-
ity principle, the case law on proportionality rejects numerical sharing, at 
least in principle. See id. at *10 (“In making this determination, the court 
notes that it is not appropriate to determine the value of the non-asserted 
standard-essential patents based merely on numbers. If a patent holder owns 
ten out of a hundred patents essential to a given standard, it does not auto-
matically mean that it contributes 10% of the value of the standard.”); id. (em-
phasizing that a “commonly understood principle of proportionality [is] that 
[c]ompensation under [RAND] must reflect the patent owner’s proportion of all 
essential patents,” and that “[t]his is not simply a numeric equation but the 
compensation must, within reasonable bounds, reflect the contribution” (citing 
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12)). 
 240. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 241. Gregory Sidak argues that it is wrong to treat the hypothetical negoti-
ation as being between one SEP holder and a solitary representative of all im-
plementers because this gives monopsony power to the implementers. See 
Sidak, supra note 14, at 985. Our argument towards the same conclusion does 
not turn on monopsony power, however. While we agree that it would be 
wrong to credit the implementers with monopsony power, because the negotia-
tion is hypothetical we could posit a negotiation with a single representative 
user, simply by not crediting that user with monopsony power. 
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user individually ensures that the reward to the patentee is 
commensurate with both the value to the user and the value to 
the standard. 
With that said, looking to the value of the patent to the 
standard might well have practical merit in a particular case if, 
for example, there is good evidence that the technology in ques-
tion was of little importance to the standard, and that the de-
fendant is a more or less average user. That is, looking to the 
value of the patent to the standard may, given the evidence, be 
a good proxy for looking to the value of the standard to the par-
ticular user.242 On the other hand, given the individualized na-
ture of patent litigation, there will often be direct evidence 
about the value of the patented technology to the particular 
user, in which case consideration of the value of patent to the 
technology can simply be ignored. To give independent content 
to the value of the patent to the standard would imply that if a 
patent was valuable to the standard (which presumably means 
it is valuable to most users), but worthless to a particular user, 
that particular user might be liable to pay a substantial royalty 
(though presumably somewhat less than the average user). We 
see no particular merit in such a rule. 
Our approach does imply that users for whom the standard 
is equally valuable will pay the same royalty, but users who 
value the standard differently may pay different amounts. 
There is some debate in the literature as to whether the “non-
discriminatory” part of FRAND means that all users must pay 
the same amount, or only that similarly situated users must 
pay the same amount.243 We adopt the latter view. This is con-
sistent with the user apportionment principle set out in the 
case law, which specifies that the royalty must reflect the use-
fulness of the patent to the particular user, as well as to the 
standard.244 It is also efficient, because it amounts to allowing 
perfect price discrimination between users. However, if the 
view ultimately prevails that “nondiscriminatory” means that 
one royalty is charged to all users, this can be modeled in our 
approach by a game in which the users are represented by a 
 
 242. See Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *8 (considering only the value to 
the standard on the basis that this also reflects the value to the user). 
 243. See Carlton & Shampine, supra note 42, at 545–46 (reviewing the de-
bate among economists regarding application of the nondiscriminatory princi-
ple). 
 244. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
relevant legal rules. 
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single user, who values the standard in a way that reflects 
some kind of general preferences of the users.245 
B. THE IMPACT OF EX ANTE COMPETITION 
A second technical issue is how our model deals with ex 
ante competition to be included in the standard. The incre-
mental ex ante principle that we have critiqued in the main 
text246 can be understood as a particular form of a broader prin-
ciple that competition will constrain the amount a patentee can 
charge ex ante, but once the standard is adopted, that con-
straint is eliminated. Swanson and Baumol’s auction model is 
in turn a particular instantiation of the incremental ex ante 
principle, which we have argued is unsound, in part because it 
effectively treats patented alternatives as unpatented.247 On the 
other hand, we agree that a reasonable royalty should be 
capped by the incremental value of the patented technology as 
compared with the best unpatented technology that could have 
been incorporated into the standard. That view effectively ig-
nores patented alternatives entirely. This raises two questions. 
First, how does the use of unpatented alternatives as a cap on 
the value of the patented technology emerge from our frame-
work? It might be said that if the negotiation takes place con-
tingent on the ex post information as to what technology has 
been selected to be part of the patent, then the user cannot 
credibly threaten to switch to an unpatented technology, any 
more than it can threaten to switch to an alternative patented 
technology, because either case would require the user to give 
up the benefits of standardization. Second, there is evidently a 
middle ground between treating patented alternatives as if 
they were unpatented, and ignoring them entirely. We have ar-
gued that a negotiation model is preferable to Swanson and 
Baumol’s auction model;248 and we acknowledged that in gen-
eral, outside the standards context, the presence of patented al-
ternatives is likely to affect the royalty received by the chosen 
patentee, even if it does not result in the royalty being driven 
down to zero.249 How does this fit with our ex post framework? 
 
 245. How exactly the users’ preferences should be aggregated is a difficult 
question which we will not deal with, as we are not sympathetic to this inter-
pretation of the “nondiscriminatory” requirement. 
 246. See supra Part III.A. 
 247. See supra Part II. 
 248. See supra Part II.D. 
 249. In Innovatio, Judge Holderman rejected the auction model, on the ba-
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We must always keep in mind that our contingent ex ante 
framework is simply a mechanism for determining a reasonable 
royalty. We have pointed out that the traditional ex ante 
framework should not be taken literally; simply because the 
negotiation is assumed to take place ex ante, it should not be 
automatically assumed that the parties only have ex ante in-
formation.250 The ex ante nature of the negotiation is a con-
struct used to ensure that the patentee cannot extract sunk 
costs, which would otherwise distort user and patentee incen-
tives. Our contingent ex ante framework is similarly a mecha-
nism which is used to ensure the appropriate incentive. 
On the first point, the use of unpatented alternatives is 
necessary to ensure that the patentee does not capture more 
than the value of the previously existing technology. This is the 
general argument for capping a reasonable royalty at the value 
of the best noninfringing alternative. Consequently, the argu-
ment that in a truly ex post approach the user would not be 
able to switch to an unpatented alternative is beside the point. 
An ex post informational framework is not desirable in itself; it 
is desirable because it implements sound policy objectives. If 
the availability of an unpatented alternative does not emerge 
naturally from considering a contingent ex post hypothetical 
negotiation, then we will build it in. And it is very easy to build 
in; when the Shapley value is assessed, we need only assume 
that all unpatented technologies are “in the room” from the 
outset. So, if the standard consists of a single patented technol-
ogy which is no better than an unpatented alternative, the 
Shapley value for that technology would be zero, because it 
does not provide any incremental benefit over the best technol-
ogy that could have been implemented using all the technolo-
gies “in the room” prior to the entry of the patented technology. 
Similarly, suppose that patented technology A is necessary to 
implement the standard (e.g., WLAN transmission capability), 
and another technology adds value (e.g., battery saving func-
tionality). If a patented technology B is used to implement the 
battery saving functionality, but there is an unpatented tech-
 
sis that it is not plausible that competition between patentees would result in 
them bargaining down to zero, but he nonetheless apparently accepts in prin-
ciple that ex ante competition would drive down the royalty to some degree 
(though that was not a factor on the facts). In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC 
Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 250. See supra note 120 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
knowledge in our model. 
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nology that would serve equally well, the incremental value 
added by technology B is always zero, regardless of the order in 
which it is added to the mix of technologies, and so its Shapley 
value is zero. 
The second problem (regarding the existence of patented 
alternatives) is more subtle. One question is how, technically, 
the effect of ex ante competition could be incorporated into our 
model. The second, more difficult question, is whether it is de-
sirable to allow the ex ante competition to affect the reasonable 
royalty. 
The answer to the technical question is reasonably 
straightforward: the presence of ex ante competition should be 
reflected in increased bargaining power for the user in the con-
tingent ex ante negotiation. To begin, consider an example from 
outside the SEP context. Suppose that Cialis and Viagra are 
perfect substitutes for treating erectile dysfunction. Under 
Swanson and Baumol’s auction model, the price of either would 
be zero, because one could be played off against the other. We 
have argued that this is unsound in terms of dynamic effi-
ciency, and implausible in practice.251 However, it is entirely 
plausible that the price that Pfizer can charge for Viagra in the 
presence of competition from Cialis is less than it would be if 
Viagra were the only product in its class. In a negotiation 
model, the effect of competition between Cialis and Viagra is to 
increase the user’s bargaining power. Using arbitrary numbers 
to illustrate, if only Viagra is available, and it is worth $100 to 
the user, and the user and Pfizer have equal bargaining power, 
the user will pay $50. If Cialis is then developed, it is not plau-
sible that the price for Viagra would drop to zero, as the auction 
model or Bertrand competition implies, but it is plausible that 
it would drop as compared with the monopoly price, say to 
$40.252 
To extend this to the SEP context, suppose there are two 
equivalent patented technologies, A and B, which are compet-
ing to be part of the standard. Even if A is selected, it seems 
plausible that the price that could be demanded by A would be 
depressed by ex ante competition from B, in the same way that 
the price that can be demanded by Viagra is depressed by ex 
post competition from Cialis. In our contingent ex ante model, 
 
 251. See supra Part II.C. 
 252. This does not imply any particular model of duopoly competition, such 
as Cournot competition. 
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the users are assumed to bargain with the successful patentee, 
A, with knowledge that A has been selected, so that users can-
not use the threat of switching to B to drive down the price.253 
In this model the presence of ex ante competition by B can be 
reflected by increasing the user’s bargaining power relative to a 
case in which there was no ex ante competition. If there is only 
one WLAN technology, A, worth $100 to the user, and the user 
and A have equal bargaining power, the user will pay $50. If we 
now suppose that ex ante there was another equivalent tech-
nology, B, that could have been included into the standard that 
would have depressed the price that could be demanded by A, 
this can be reflected by increasing the user’s bargaining power 
in the ex post negotiation, even though the parties are assumed 
to know that A has been chosen, so that the user cannot 
threaten to switch to B. It may be said that this smuggles ex 
ante competition into our ex post model. If so, we are uncon-
cerned. Again, our model is a conceptual mechanism for deter-
mining a reasonable royalty. We are not concerned if the con-
struction of the hypothetical negotiation has some constraints 
that appear ad hoc in terms of how a contingent ex ante nego-
tiation might be said to proceed, so long as they are those con-
straints are sound as a matter of policy. After all, it has always 
been recognized that the standard hypothetical negotiation is 
artificial, since in many cases the parties in question would 
never actually have negotiated ex ante.254 
With that said, we would point out that the use of a contin-
gent ex ante negotiation really addresses two functional points. 
First, that the negotiation takes place ex ante is used to ensure 
that the patentee cannot extract sunk costs. Second, that the 
parties are assumed to have ex post information—they know 
which technology has been selected—is used to ensure that in-
centive to invent is appropriate, by ensuring that the patentee 
whose patents are actually infringed is in a position to demand 
a royalty. The same goals could be achieved by making the con-
verse assumptions: the hypothetical negotiation takes place ex 
post, but in the absence of user sunk costs. In that case, pat-
entee A, whose patent was actually infringed, would be entitled 
to the full royalty, but the assumption that the user has no 
 
 253. See supra Part III.A. 
 254. See, e.g., John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Ne-
gotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 799–803 (2013) (describing the value of ex ante and 
ex post knowledge in hypothetical negotiations). 
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sunk costs means that the user could credibly threaten to 
switch to another standard, including another patented stan-
dard, if A demanded too much. In this model, the ex post com-
petition from alternative standards would limit the patentee’s 
bargaining power in exactly the same way that the availability 
of Cialis limits Pfizer’s bargaining power. The impact of compe-
tition on the user’s bargaining power may seem to emerge more 
naturally from this model, but it is equivalent to the contingent 
ex ante model. 
The more difficult question is whether ex ante competition 
should be taken into account at all. While it is intuitive to say 
that the extent of ex ante competition should constrain the roy-
alty, even if it does not drive the price to zero, the efficiency ar-
gument for this position is not clear. As discussed above, all 
that is required from a static efficiency perspective is that the 
reasonable royalty is less than the ex ante value of the technol-
ogy (that is, excluding sunk costs) to the user as compared with 
the best unpatented alternative.255 That condition is satisfied 
even if ex ante competition is not taken into account at all, be-
cause in a contingent ex ante negotiation the user will not 
agree to pay more than the value of the technology excluding 
sunk costs, even if there is only one patented choice for the 
standard. From a dynamic efficiency perspective (the incentive 
to invent), a reasonable royalty must be greater than the mar-
ginal cost and less than the full social surplus. Again, the rea-
sonable royalty determined in a contingent ex ante negotiation 
will satisfy that criterion even if patented competition is ig-
nored entirely. 
As discussed above, to take ex ante competition into ac-
count in a negotiation model (that is to say, without driving the 
royalty down to zero, as in the auction model), would shift the 
bargaining power in favour of the user. But as we have noted, 
there is no satisfactory theory of the optimal return to a pat-
entee, and in the absence of such a model we cannot say 
whether that shift would be optimal in theory. 
Because of the absence of a good theory of the optimal re-
turn to a patentee, we took the return to a similarly situated 
patentee to be the appropriate benchmark. The question then is 
what counts as a similarly situated patentee? In general, com-
peting patented technologies arise because different inventors 
 
 255. See supra Part II.B. 
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are trying to solve the same problem.256 This is part of the pat-
ent race problem, which manifests itself partly in increased 
costs of invention, as various parties seek to be first, but also in 
increased competition and reduced profits within a class of 
products.257 Because the problem is a general one, we might say 
that the appropriate benchmark is competing patents outside 
the standards context, such as Viagra and Cialis. If the return 
to Viagra is in fact affected by competition from Cialis, and vice 
versa, then if there is similar competition to develop technology 
intended for a standard, the return to the successful patentee 
should be similarly reduced to reflect that competition, or in-
ventors racing to be part of a standard will receive a higher 
payoff than inventors racing to be capture a non-standardized 
market. 
The other salient comparison is with an invention that be-
comes a de facto standard by virtue of being first to market. If 
technology A captures the market, the difficulty of switching 
means that the royalty that A can charge will not be reduced 
even if equivalent technologies are subsequently developed. Put 
another way, because of the nature of the market for a stan-
dard, ex post competition from equivalent products will not de-
press royalties in the same way as in a market without network 
effects. 
In our view, it is preferable to ignore the effect of ex ante 
competition on price. While it is appealing to imagine ex ante 
price competition (even contingent ex ante competition, as in 
our model), price competition is not in fact a part of the process 
of developing a standard.258 In our view, that is for the best. 
Apart from concerns about antitrust violations if pricing were 
to be discussed during the standard development process, the 
technical task of developing a sound standard is difficult 
enough as it is, which is why the engineers prefer to be able to 
 
 256. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry, 75 AM. 
ECON. REV., 25, 29–30 (1985). 
 257. The patent race literature normally emphasizes costs, because the 
usual model is one in which the inventors are competing to develop exactly the 
same invention, leading to a winner-take-all race. More realistically, in many 
cases the competing inventors will develop inventions which are patentably 
distinct yet close substitutes. In such cases, the competition will raise costs, as 
in the classic patent race, but will also depress profits. 
 258. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, PATENT 
CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 60 (Keith 
Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013) (“[F]ew SSOs have adopted policies 
with regard to ex ante disclosure of licensing terms.”). 
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do so based on purely technical considerations. Apart from 
these practical considerations, there are theoretical objections 
to allowing price competition in the standard setting process. It 
might mean an inferior standard would be adopted. This would 
be desirable only if the deadweight loss from increased adop-
tion due to the higher price for the technically superior stan-
dard at a higher price more than outweighed the increased con-
sumer surplus due to the technical superiority. Whether that is 
true is an empirical question which depends on the particular 
markets and the exact price reduction at issue. It would be im-
possible to assess with the requisite degree of certainty during 
ex ante negotiations. For that reason, we think the current ap-
proach of focusing on the technical aspects of the standard is 
sound. 
Ignoring ex ante competition implies that the appropriate 
comparison is with an invention that becomes a de facto stan-
dard. In our view, this is also appropriate because it avoids dis-
torting the standards process. If a de facto standard was able to 
charge a price unconstrained by the threat of a switch to a 
competing standard, while a formal standard was so limited, 
this would provide an incentive to avoid formal standards, even 
when formal standards might be more efficient and provide for 
earlier standardization. 
In summary, while there is considerable intuitive appeal to 
imagining that royalties would be constrained by ex ante com-
petition, there is no reason to believe that constrained royalties 
would be superior in terms of either static or dynamic effi-
ciency. The question should therefore turn on what is the ap-
propriate real-world benchmark for a patent that has been se-
lected to be included in a standard. In our view, the appropriate 
benchmark is the situation of a patentee with a de facto stan-
dard which emerged in the absence of competition, because this 
benchmark ensures that the choice between a de facto standard 
and a formal standard is financially neutral. 
